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Appendix 1:
Foreign Monopoly and Merger Law
This Appendix consists of brief descriptions of the monopoly
and merger laws of several nations. These descriptions are not intended to
provide a complete statement of any one nation's antitrust statutes and case
law. Rather, they are included in this volume to permit the reader to observe
the widely divergent approaches to the regulation of economic concentration.
These summaries may not contain the latest case law developments or
statutory amendments. It is hoped, however, that they provide a sound start-




Trade Practices Act, No. 51 of 1974 as amended by Acts Nos. 56 and 63,
1975; Nos. 88 and 157, 1976; Nos. 81, 111, and 151, 1977; Nos. 206 and
207, 1978.
Synopsis
The Trade Practices Act (the Act) of 1974 inaugurated an era of aggressive
antitrust policy in Australia. Modeled on the Sherman and Clayton Acts,
Part IV of the Act makes a wide variety of anticompetitive practices illegal.
Although the Australian economy is composed largely of small- and medium-
sized firms, Sections 46 and 50 of the Act demonstrate the Australian govern-
ment's desire to control economic concentration. The former forbids monopo-
listic behavior; the latter forbids anticompetitive mergers.
The Act does not make acquisition of market control illegal. Once a
corporation gains power to determine prices or control production or distribu-
tion of "a substantial part of the goods or services in a market" however, it is
subject to the per se prohibitions set forth in Section 46. Specifically, a
monopolist cannot:
1. eliminate or substantially damage a competitor in any market;
2. prevent the entry of a person into any market;
3. deter or prevent a person from competing in any market.
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Certain conduct is exempted from the monopolization prohibition, including
practices relating exclusively to the export of goods or supply of services
outside of Australia.
Section 50 seeks to prevent anticompetitive mergers. Patterned after
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976), this section provides
that:
A corporation shall not acquire, directly, or indirectly, any shares in the
capital, or any assets of a body corporate if-
(a) as a result of the acquistion, the corporation would be, or be likely
to be, in a position to control or dominate a market for goods or
services; or
(b) in a case where the corporation is in a position to control or domi-
nate a market for goods or services-
(ii) the acquisition would, or would be likely to, substantially
strengthen the power of the corporation to control or dominate
[any market in which the corporation is a competitor].
For purposes of Section 50 only, a market is defined as a substantial
market for goods or services in Australia or in a state.
Under Part VII of the Act, a corporation can petition the Trade Practices
Commission (Commission) for authorization of a proposed merger. If authori-
zation is obtained, the applicant is protected against subsequent actions al-
leging that the authorized merger violates the Act.
The Commission is a five-member panel charged with administration of
the Act. In addition to granting authorization for proposed mergers and other
potentially anticompetitive agreements, the Commission can investigate al-
leged violations of the Act and bring charges against alleged violators in the
Australian Industrial Court. The Commission does not have power to enforce
its own orders.
The Trade Practices Tribunal (Tribunal) is a quasi-judicial body that
reviews Commission decisions regarding authorization applications. The
Tribunal applies the same tests as the Commission in its review of authoriza-
tion applications. If necessary, the Tribunal may modify or set aside the
Commission's decisions. As with the Commission, the members of the Tribu-
nal are appointed by the governor general and enjoy substantial indepen-
dence from the legislative and executive branches of government.
Exclusive jurisdiction for violations of the Act lies with the Industrial
Court. If a violation is established, the offender is subject to an injunction, a
fine of up to $50,000 in the case of a person and $250,000 in the case of
corporations, and liability for damages resulting from violation of the Act. If a
merger is found to be illegal, the acquiring firm can also be ordered to divest
itself of the acquired assets or shares.
In actions brought by the Commission or the minister of business and
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commerce, any of these remedies can be requested. In actions filed by pri-
vate parties, the plaintiff can request either injunctive relief (except in the
case of allegedly anticompetitive mergers) or compensation for damages di-
rectly resulting from the defendant's anticompetitive acts.
The Act does not make any restrictive trade practice a crime. However,
because the civil fines imposed by the Act are similar to criminal penalities,
the Australian Federal Court has required that parties alleging violations of
the Act bear a standard of proof greater than the preponderance of evidence
standard normally required in civil litigation.
CASES
Top Performance Motors Pty. Ltd. v. Ira Berk (Queensland) Pty. Ltd., (1975)
5 Argus L.R. 465.
Trade Practices Commission v. Vaponordic (Australia) Pty. Ltd., (1975) 6
Argus L.R. 248.
Trade Practices Commission v. Sharp Corporation of Australia Pty. Ltd.,
(1975) 8 Argus L.R. 255.
Quadramain Pty. Ltd. v. Sevastapol Investments Pty. Ltd., (1976) 8 Argus
L.R. 555.
Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd., (1976) 25 F.L.R. 169.
Trade Practices Commission v. Guest's Garage Pty., [1976] A.T.P.R. 40-
016.
Re Howard Smith Industries Pty. Ltd., (1977) 15 Argus L.R. 645.
Phelps v. Western Mining Corporation Ltd., [19781 A.T.P.R. 40-077.
Re Tooth & Co. Ltd., [19781 A.T.P.R. 40-084.
Trade Practices Commission v. Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty.
Ltd., [19781 A.T.P.R. 40-071.
Western Australia Football League, Inc. and the West Perth Football Club,
Inc., [19791 A.T.P.R. 18-017.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Breyer, Five Questions about Australian Anti-Trust Law, 51 AUSTL. L. REV.
28 (1977).
D'Aloisio, Trade Practices Act 1977: Restrictive Trade Practices and
Mergers, 52 L. INST. J. 380 (1978).
Giles, The Role of the Trade Practices Commission when Appearing before
the Trade Practices Tribunal in Support of its Determinations, 51
AUSTL. L.J. 199 (1977).
Gummow, Abuse of Monopoly: Industrial Property and Trade Practices Con-
trol, 7 SYDNEY L. REV. 339 (1976).
Harrison, Joint Ventures and the Trade Practices Act 1974: The American
Approach and its Applicability to Australia, 3 AUSTL. B. L. REV. 117
(1975).
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Lucas, Monopolization and the Shopping Centre Developer, L. & Soc'Y J. 209
(1977).
Pengilley, Section 45 of the Trade Practices Act-the Law and Administra-
tion to Date, 8 FED. L. REV. 15 (1976-77).
Pierce, Effect on Competition of Corporate Acquisitions as a Factor in Au-
thorisation Applications to the Trade Practices Commission, 9 FED. L.
REV. 71 (1978).
Santow, Mergers and the Commonwealth Trade Practices Act 1974, 49
AUSTL. L.J. 52 (1975).
Santow & Gonski, Mergers After the Trade Practices Act 1974-77, 52
AUSTL. L.J. 132 (1978).
Wallace, The Constitutional Reach of the Trade Practices Act and the Liabil-
ity of Corporate Officers, 52 AUSTL. L.J. 682 (1977).
Wallace, Public Benefit and Authorisation Determinations under the Trade
Practices Act 1974, 4 AUSTL. B. L. REV. 175 (1976).
G. WIDMER, RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AND MERGERS (1977).
Williamson, Trade Practices Law-Its Implications for Mining and Petro-
leum Joint Ventures, 1 AUSTL. MINING & PETROLEUM J. 59 (1977).
BELGIUM
LAW
Belgian Act of 27 May 1960 on Protection Against the Abuse of Economic
Power ("Moniteur Belge" of 22 June 1960); Article 36 of the Law of 30
December 1970, as amended by Law of 17 August 1973 on Notification of
Mergers and Acquisitions (B.S.G. of 8 September 1973).
Synopsis
Article 1 of the Belgian Act of 27 May 1960 on Protection Against the Abuse
of Economic Power (the Act) defines economic power as the power of indi-
viduals or corporations, acting alone or in concert, to exert a "dominating
influence" over merchandise supplies or prices, capital markets, or service
prices. However, under Article 2, an "abuse of economic power" exists only
when persons holding economic power "prejudice the public interest" by
engaging in practices which distort or restrict competition, economic free-
dom, or the development of production or trade. No well-defined categories of
abuse are enumerated in the Act, and the mere holding of a dominant market
position is not considered a per se violation. Rather, a dominant position must
be used to the detriment of "the public interest" as determined by the compe-
tent authorities.
A very detailed multilevel investigative procedure is established for deter-
mining whether an abuse of economic power exists. The reporting commis-
sioner conducts the initial investigation; the Council for Economic Disputes
(the Council) serves as the administrative tribunal with the authority to
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decide not to proceed; and the minister of economic affairs can institute
proceedings, aid in the investigation, and participate in a final decision for
the Council. If this procedure results in an affirmative finding of abuse of
economic power, then the minister suggests proposals for conciliation, makes
recommendations in the event of noncompliance with the proposals, issues a
cease and desist order if the recommendations are not followed, and insti-
tutes, at his discretion, civil or criminal proceedings should any of the above
methods fail to achieve the desired result. Actual enforcement of the Act has
had limited success, since most actions brought thus far have involved lim-
ited private interests rather than at the general public interest, and thus have
not been covered by the Act.
The 1970 notification statute requires that the minister of economic
affairs, the minister of finance, and the secretary of state for regional econ-
omy be notified of any transfer to non-Belgians of a one-third capital interest
in a Belgian enterprise having funds of at least B.Frs.100 million. Addition-
ally, the minister of finance must authorize any public offer for purchase or
exchange of Belgian securities made by Belgian individuals living abroad or
by Belgian companies under foreign control. Failure to obtain proper authori-
zation can lead to a public notice by the minister which prohibits anyone
from aiding the transaction. These notification requirements are limited to
mergers and acquisitions by foreign participants, thus giving the government
a means of controlling foreign direct investment.
SECONDARY SOURCES
COMPETITION LAW IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE USA, (GijIstra & Murphy,
eds., 1976) (with looseleaf supplements).
OECD-GuIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, Vol. I
(1964).
[19741 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 21,521 et seq.
BRAZIL
LAW
Antitrust Law No. 4134 (1962); Regulations to the Antitrust Law, Decree
52-025 (1964).
Synopsis
Brazilian Antitrust Law No. 4134 (the Act) seeks to "eliminate abuses of
economic power referred to in Article 148 of the Federal Constitution." Arti-
cle 2 of the Act prohibits the following conduct:
1. Manipulation of markets or elimination of competition, by means of
agreements, accumulation of companies or shares, mergers or other
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associations, concentration of capital, accumulation of managerial
control, cessation of business activity, or obstruction of the formation
or operation of other companies;
2. Arbitrary increases in profits of natural or actual monopolies by rais-
ing prices without need for expansion or other just cause;
3. Creation of monopolistic conditions [defined below] or excessive
speculation for the purpose of promoting a temporary increase in
prices by cutting back on productive capacity, any form of attempted
monopolization, withholding goods from a market with a view to-
ward creating a shortage, or use of artificial means to cause price
fluctuations;
4. Formation of economic groupings of companies which restrict free
actions of buyers and sellers by discriminating as to prices or ser-
vices to the purchase of a product or service;
5. Unfair competitive practices, such as demanding exclusive promo-
tional advertising or making prior agreements as to prices or other
benefits when dealing with government officials.
Monopolistic conditions is defined as those conditions "in which a company
or group of companies so controls the production, distribution, and sale of a
product or service that it exercise a preponderant influence on prices."
The statute requires registration of corporate agreements. Article 72 re-
quires that documents referring to the establishment, transformation, merger,
or association of companies, or changes in the articles of incorporation, cannot
be registered without broad disclosure of relevant information regarding the
share ownership, operation, purpose, and location of the corporate enterprise.
Disclosure of financial information concerning the partners and directors of
the enterprise is also required.
Article 74 prohibits certain types of contracts entered into without prior
government scrutiny and approval:
Unless approved and registered with CADE [described below], any con-
tracts, agreements, or conventions of any kind... shall be void if made
for any one of the following purposes:
(a) to put production on par with consumption;
(b) to control a market;
(c) to standardize production;
(d) to stabilize prices;
(e) to divide markets between companies, whether of production or
distribution;
(f) to restrict disfribution in such a way as to harm equivalent or sub-
stitute goods.
Chapter II of the statute establishes a federal government agency-the
Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE)-that is charged
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with enforcement of Brazilian antitrust laws. CADE is given extensive in-
vestigatory powers. A general counsel is established to assist CADE with
legal advice and to insure that CADE's regulations and pronouncements are
enforced.
CADE is divided into five sections. The Economic Group performs eco-
nomic, statistical, and general quantitative analysis. The Control Group su-
pervises nationalized enterprises. The Auditing Group supervises the ac-
counting of all Brazilian firms. The Administrative Group provides basic
administrative and support services for CADE. The Regional Inspectorates are
charged "with the task of representing and assisting CADE in the perfor-
mance of the attributes conferred upon them by law and these regulations."
CADE has sole responsibility for investigations into, and prosecutions
of, "abuses of economic power." State and local authorities are not permit-
ted to conduct their own investigations; rather they must submit their alle-
gations to CADE for enforcement. Individuals can also bring possible viola-
tions of the antitrust laws to the attention of CADE. However, the statute
vests exclusive authority to prosecute and enforce the law in CADE. Thus,
Brazilian antitrust laws do not recognize a private right of action for anti-
trust violations.
The remedies available to CADE in enforcing the law are quite substan-
tial. Fines can range from five to ten thousand times the highest minimum
wage in the country on the date of CADE's decision. The fine is assessed
even if the defendant agrees to terminate the illegal activity. In addition to
the fine, CADE can require that the company correct its practices and come
into compliance with the law within a certain period of time. If the defendant
does not comply within this time period, or if after being corrected the defen-
dant again engages in the illegal activity, CADE can impose another fine-
double the previous fine. Moreover, if a defendant's pledge to refrain from
illegal conduct is broken, the statute provides for a mandatory expropriation
of corporate assets.
Enforcement of fines requires judicial process. In lieu of collecting a
fine, CADE can petition the Federal District Court of the state where the
defendant company is located for imposition of government control over the
company. The government-appointed administrator is obligated to take steps
necessary to eliminate the abuses that required government intervention.
Once the abuses are eliminated, the government administrator may be re-
moved and the corporation returned to private administration.
Government directorship does not affect the normal operation of the
defendant firm; the only change in operation is the placement of a govern-
ment official at the pinnacle of power. However, should the majority of those
responsible for the administration of the company refuse to cooperate with
the government administrator, a judge can order the government administra-
tor to assume full responsibility for the company. Further, a judge can dis-
miss any company official who attempts to prevent the government adminis-




Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970; as amended S.C. 1974-75-76 c.
76, 1977 c. 28; Foreign Investment Review Act, S.C. 1973, c. 46, as
amended; Bill C-13, an act to amend the Combines Investigation Act (intro-
duced into Parliament on November 18, 1977; the Bill would have to be
reintroduced to be considered again).
Synopsis
The Combines Investigation Act (the Act) defines a merger as any acquisi-
tion by one or more persons, whether by purchase or lease of shares or
assets, or any control over or interest in the business of an competitior,
supplier, customer, or any other person whereby competition is or is likely to
be lessened contrary to the interest of consumers, producers, or the general
public. A monopoly exists when one or more persons substantially control the
business in which they are engaged, and have operated, or are likely to
operate, such business against the public interest.
Sections 5 to 14 describe the functions of the director of investigation
and research. Private citizens can apply for an inquiry by the director if
they believe that someone has or will commit a merger. The Director will
commence an inquiry when he receives such an application, has reason to
believe such an inquiry should be instituted, or has been directed by the
minister to make such an inquiry. The director can require production of a
business' tax returns. The director also has broad powers to search prop-
erties and to seize evidence relevant to his inquiry. This evidence is admis-
sible in any hearing.
Sections 16 through 22 establish the Restrictive Trade Practices Com-
mission (RTPC), provide for submission of evidence by the director, author-
ize publication of RTPC reports, and establish the right of an investigated
party to be represented by counsel. The RTPC hears evidence of the director
and the defenses of the parties involved. The RTPC then makes a report to
the minister containing a review of the evidence, a conclusion as to the effect
on the public interest of the arrangements, and a recommendation as to
remedies. The RTPC has substantial investigatory powers.
The director can make a general inquiry into monopolistic conditions on
his own initiative or when authorized by the minister.
Section 33 provides that every person who is a party or privy to or
knowingly assists in a merger or monopoly is guilty of an indictable offense
and is liable to imprisonment for up to two years or to a fine not exceeding
$5,000 or both. Section 20 grants judges the power to prohibit or to dissolve a
merger or monopoly.
Under Bill C-13 the Competition Board is substituted for the Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission. The Board has as its objective the examination
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of trade practices referred to it. The Board can examine mergers and monop-
olies as well as other trade practices. Violation of the merger provisions of the
Act is no longer considered a criminal offense under Bill C-13.
Bill C-13 also replaces the previous director of investigation with the
competition policy advocate. The Canadian Cabinet appoints the advocate
and deputy competition policy advocates. The advocate's functions are essen-
tially the same as the director's, but his quasi-judicial responsibilities include
a greater number that are reviewable by the Competition Board. The advo-
cate also has a more active role in presenting the government's position
before administrative bodies.
In lieu of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" of detriment to the public,
the bill substitutes a "preponderance of the evidence" standard. The Board, if
the advocate meets this standard, can prohibit or dissolve any merger that
substantially lessens competition.
A merger is defined broadly as any acquisition or establishment by a
person of any control over or interest in the whole or any part of the business
of another, whether in a trade, industry, or profession. A joint venture is
included within the definition of a merger if it includes the creation of a new
corporation.
The provisions of the proposed law are applicable to both conglomerate
and vertical mergers. Only horizontal mergers whose effect is to place more
than 20 percent of the market in the hands of the acquirer are subject to
review by the Board.
The participating companies to a proposed merger can defend the pro-
priety of their merger on grounds that it will increase the efficiency of the
Canadian economy. If the Board is satisfied that a merger has brought
about or will probably bring about a substantial increase in efficiency, it
cannot issue a remedial order. However, even if the merger increases effi-
ciency, the Board must rule against the merger if it would create monopoly
in the relevant market. Bill C-13 also addresses the coordination of merger
review under the Act with merger review under the Foreign Investment
Review Act.
The purpose of the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA) is to allow
foreign direct investment or takeover of Canadian businesses only if such
action significantly benefits the Canadian economy. The Review Act lists
several factors to consider in deciding whether to approve a foreign acquisi-
tion. These factors are directed toward determining whether foreign *control
will promote efficiency or competition in the Canadian economy.
The FIRA applies to acquisition of control of any Canadian enterprise
except Crown corporations, certain tax-exempt enterprises, associated busi-
ness enterprises, and small business enterprises. The FIRA also applies to
establishment of all new businesses.
All companies seeking foreign acquisitions or direct investments covered
by the FIRA must give notice to the Foreign Investment Review Agency (the
Agency). The minister, a member of the Queen's Privy Council appointed by
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the governor to administer the FIRA, can also demand such notice if he
believes such foreign proposals or actual investments have occurred. After
the Agency is notified, the minister will assess whether the foreign invest-
ment is or will likely be of significant benefit to Canada. If the minister finds
the investment is of significant benefit, then he will make a recommendation
to approve the investment to the governor in council. Involved parties have
the right to represent themselves before the governor. If the governor decides
the investment is of significant benefit, he shall allow the investment. But if
he does not make such a finding, the governor in council must deny the
proposed investment. Section 13 provides that investments are allowed if the
governor in council issues no order within sixty days after he is notified by
the agency of the proposed or actual investment.
Sections 15 through 18 provide for investigations. These sections grant
the minister broad powers with respect to searches, seizures, and obtaining
relevant evidence.
Sections 19 to 23 concern remedies available to the minister to obtain
compliance with his orders. The minister can obtain an injunction against a
company violating his order. The minister can also seek an order by a supe-
rior court to render an investment nugatory or an order to comply with the
undertaking. Anyone who does not comply with a superior court order is
subject to a contempt citation.
Sections 24 to 27 establish penalties for offenses under the FIRA. Fail-
ure to give notice of a proposed investment is an offense punishable by a fine
of no more than Canadian $5,000. Any obstruction of an investigation under
the FIRA is an offense punishable by a fine of no more than Canadian $5,000
or imprisonment of not more than six months or both.
REGULATIONS
Foreign Investment Review Regulations-under the Foreign Investment Re-
view Act: SOR/77-226, P.C. 1077-606, gazetted March 23, 1977 as
amended by SOR/78-589, P.C. 1978-2309 gazetted August 9, 1978.
Sections 3 through 5 give interpretations of noneligible person, gross
assets and gross revenue, and notices. The regulations also describe the
information the applicant must provide to the Agency. The regulations re-
quire the applicant to summarize its proposal, give detailed information on
the financial status of the acquiring and acquired businesses, and provide
details of the applicant's plans for the Canadian business enterprise. The
information sought is designed to facilitate a determination of whether a
foreign investment significantly benefits Canada.
CASES
R. v. K. C. Irving Ltd. and three other Corporations, 72 D.L.R.2d 12 N.B.
488 (S.C.C. 1977). A corporation can defend a charge of merger or
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monopoly under the Combines Investigation Act by arguing its anti-
competitive acts are not detrimental because of economic gains from a
merger or monopoly unrelated to the merger's effects on competition.
A court in a merger or monopoly case must weigh the detriment of lost
competition against the value of economic gains from the merger or
monopoly to determine whether such merger or monopoly is detrimen-
tal to the public.
R. v. F. W. Woolworth Co. Ltd., 46 D.L.R.2d 345, 18 C.C.C.2d 23, 3 Ont. R.
2d 630 (C.A.) (1974), rev'g. 11 C.C.C.2d 562, 11 C.P.R.2d 229, 21
C.R.N. 8. 371 (Ont. H.C.T.)-Prohibition order under Combines In-
vestigation Act must relate to the offense for which conviction was
obtained. Such an order should be made only if the evidence shows a
deliberate and flagrant disobedience and the likelihood of continuation
in the absence of prohibition.
R. v. Canada Safeway Ltd., 41 D.L.R.2d 264, 14 C.C.C.2d 14, 12 C.P.R.2d
3 (1973), 1 W.W.R. 210 (Alta. S.C.T.P.) (1974)-Court can prohibit
acts directed toward commission of an offense under the Combines
Act.
R. v. Allied Chemical Canada Ltd., et al., 69 D.L.R.3d 506, 29 C.C.C.2d
460, 24 C.P.R.2d 22, 6 W.W.R. 481 (B.C.S.C.) (1975)--Discusses the
difference between conspiracy charges and the offense of formation
of a monopoly.
R. v. Canadian General Electric Co. Ltd., et al., 75 D.L.R.2d 664, 34
C.C.C.2d 489, 15 Ont.R.2d 360, 29 C.P.R.2d 1 (H.C.J.) (1976)-Detri-
ment to the public, a necessary element of a monopoly violation, must
be shown to flow from the operation of the shared monopoly and not
from collateral acts which may be the subject of another charge.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Reports by Restrictive Practices Commission
Prior to the 1970s, none of the reports relating to mergers of the Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission resulted in convictions of corporations. On
January 14, 1971, the RTPC issued a report that found that the substantial
control of the large lamps business in Canada by Canadian General Electric
Company Limited, Canadian Westinghouse Company Limited, and Sylvania
Electric (Canada) Ltd. resulted in a monopoly situation; therefore, such busi-
ness operated to the detriment of the public. The report recommended peri-
odic review of the customs duties on electric lamps to ensure that the tariff
was not used to insulate Canadian manufactures from competition by outside
suppliers to the disadvantage of users in Canada. On September 2, 1976, the
accused were convicted of two counts of monopoly. On April 13, 1977, fines
totaling $550,000 were imposed for monopoly and other offenses as follows:
Canadian General Electric Co. Ltd. $300,000; Westinghouse Canada Ltd.
$150,000; G.T.E. Sylvania Ltd. $100,000.
294 - Appendix I
In other proceedings referred directly to the Attorney General of Canada,
four charges of merger and monopoly were brought against K. C. Irving Ltd.,
a newspaper chain. On January 24, 1974, the accused was convicted and
fines totaling $150,000 were imposed on April 2, 1974. An order of divesti-
ture was issued on July 10, 1974. The accused successfully appealed the
convictions, sentences & order. The Crown lost its appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada on November 16, 1976.
REPORTS UNDER THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW ACT
Since the institution of FIRA, most foreign takeovers have been approved. If
the Cabinet finds some combination of the following factors, the proposed
merger will usually be approved:
1. the merger increases employment;
2. the merger constitutes a new investment;
3. the merger will increase resource processing or use of Canadian parts
and services;
4. the merger will increase exports;
5. the merging corporation is owned partially by Canadian interests;
6. the merger will improve productivity and efficiency;
7. the merger will enhance technological development;
8. the merger will improve product variety and innovation;
9. the merger will have beneficial impacts on competition; or
10. the proposed merger is compatible with industrial and economic policies.
Thus, as the FIRA has been enforced so far, only extremely unattractive
foreign mergers have been disallowed.
List of Disallowed Cases
Fiscal 1975/76. During this period, 22 out of 132 foreign takeovers were
disallowed. The following lists the applicants who were disallowed and the
nature of their business:
1. Ambassador Bridge Inc./Canada Transit Co., which operates the Cana-
dian side of the Ambassador Bridge.
2. Avco Financial Services Canada Ltd./certain assets of La Corporation de
Finance Bonaccord Lt~e, a finance company.
3. Canadian Canners Ltd./Robert G. Tamblyn Paper Box Ltd., a producer of
folding paper boxes.
4. Ciba-Geigy Canada Ltd./Stewart Seeds Ltd., a producer of cereal and
corn seed.
5. Corbetts Ltd./Maurice Rousseau & Cie. Lte, a distributor of automotive
replacement parts, accessories, and supplies.
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6. De Lavel Turbine Inc./Williams Machines, Ltd., True Forge Ltd., and
certain assets of material Processing Division of Havlik Enterprises Ltd.,
engaged in custom machine work.
7. Kibun Co. Ltd./North Sea Products Ltd., a processor of fish.
8. Lacroix, L., Fils S.A./Dominion Cigarette Tube Co. Ltd., a manufacturer
of cigarette tubes and related manufacturing machinery.
9. Larochelle et Fr~res Lt~e/La Boulangerie Racine Lt~e, a bakery firm.
10. Meyer Laboratories Inc./Neo Drug Co., which packages and distributes
ethical drugs.
11. Micco Equipment Co./Ferguson Supply Ltd., and Arctic Terex Ltd., dis-
tributors of off-highway machinery and equipment.
12. Perolin-Bird Archer Ltd./Bitish-American Chemical Co. Ltd., a manufac-
turer of industrial chemicals.
13. Quebec Ready Mix Inc./Carriere Hebert Inc., an operator of a quarry.
14. Quebec Ready Mix Inc./Sables Laves Inc., an operator of a quarry.
15. Sonotone Corp. (Canada) Ltd./Burgess Battery Division of Gould Manu-
facturing of Canada Ltd., which manufactures dry cell batteries, flash-
lights, lanterns, and rolled zinc.
16. Syntex Ltd./Mowatt & Moore Ltd., a manufacturer of pharmaceutical
products.
17. Turbex Ltd./certain assets of George Laird & Son Ltd., which sells fuel
oil and home comfort equipment.
18. UPS Ltd./Delivero (Canada) Ltd., which delivers small parcels.
19. UPS Ltd./Grenoble Distribution Ltd., which delivers small parcels.
20. Lacroix, L., Fils S.A./Central Tobacco Manufacturing Co. Ltd., a manu-
facturer of cigarette tubes and related manufacturing machinery.
21. WCI Canada Ltd.,/the appliance business of Westinghouse Canada Ltd.,
a manufacturer and distributor of major household appliances and elec-
trical industrial equipment.
22. WCI Canada Ltd./the appliance division of Westinghouse Canada (sec-
ond submission), 'a manufacturer of major household appliances and
electrical industrial equipment.
Fiscal 1976/77. During this period, 19 out of 172 foreign takeovers were
disallowed.
1. Blackwood Hodge (Canada) Ltd./Tobin Tractor (1957) Ltd., which sells,
services, and rents construction and industrial equipment.
2. Brady Industries Ltd./Bray-Dor Industries Ltd., which fabricates, installs,
and repairs industrial doors.
3. Brewster Transport Co. Ltd./Jasper Sky Tram Ltd., which operates an
aerial tramway.
4. C & J Clark Canada Ltd./Calderone Shoe Co. Ltd., which retails footwear.
5. Carisbrook Industries Inc./the Crawford-Collingwood Ontario Division of
Indian Head Inc., a manufacturer of pillows and cushions.
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6. Dow Jones & Co. Inc./Irwin-Dorsey Ltd., a textbook publisher and
distributor.
7. Dresser Industries Canada Ltd./General Abrasive (Canada) Ltd., which
manufactures aluminum oxide, silicone, carbide, and aluminum zirconia.
8. Dresser Industries, Inc./Jarco Services, Ltd., which leases hydraulic
bumper jars to the petroleum industry.
9. E.G. & G., Inc./Radionics Ltd., which distributes and services electronic
testing and research equipment.
10. Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd./R & H Products Ltd., a distributor of photo-
graphic equipment and supplies.
11. General Mills Canada, Ltd./Regal Toy, Ltd., a manufacturer of toys.
12. Gulf Oil Canada Ltd./Mosbacher Oil & Gas Ltd., engaged in exploration
for, and the development of, petroleum and natural gas fields.
13. Hayes-Dana Ltd./Western Wheel & Parts Ltd., which sells and services
heavy-duty truck components.
14. Lafarge Concrete Ltd.-Lafarge Beton Lt~e/Argus Agregates Ltd., which
crushes and processes aggregates.
15. N.V. Indivers/Canadian Vac-Hyd Processing Ltd., which sells and ser-
vices computer peripheral equipment.
17. Simon & Schuster Inc./Simon & Schuster Canada Ltd., a paperbook
publisher and distributor.
18. State Electric Co. Ltd./D. Thompson Ltd., and D. Thompson (Western)
Ltd., which are electrical contractors.
19. Welltech Inc./Gamache Well Servicing Ltd., Prairie Gold Servicing Co.,
Well Servicing Holdings Inc. and Dow Well Servicing Ltd., which en-
gage in oil and gas well completion, servicing, and workover.
Fiscal 1978/79. During this period, 25 out of 323 proposed foreign
mergers were disallowed.
1. Baker Material Hanling Corp./Otis Elevator Co. Ltd.'s facilities to distri-
bute imported forklift trucks.
2. Bank Building and Equipment Corp./Cooper Appraisals Ltd., which is
engaged in general property appraisal.
3. Bulk Transport Service Inc./Soulanges Cartage & Equipment Co. Ltd.,
which hauls bulk cement and construction materials.
4. CFMG Inc./which will acquire the fuel, heating, and home comfort equip-
ment business of S. Anglin Co. Ltd.
5. Colorcraft Corporation/Triple Print Film Labs Ltd., which is engaged in
mail-order photo-finishing.
6. Comshare Inc./Comshare Ltd., which operates a computer service
bureau.
7. Creusot-Loire Steel Corp./Brace-Meuller-Huntley (Canada) Ltd., which
warehouses machine and tool steels and aluminum bars.
8. Dow Jones & Co. Inc./Irwin-Dorsey Ltd., which distributes textbooks.
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9. Editions Etudes Vivantes Lt6e/Les Edition Julienne Inc., which pub-
lishes French language textbooks.
10. Ex-Cell-O Corp./Davidson Rubber Co. Ltd. and Associates, which manu-
facture automotive instrument panel crash pads and armrests.
11. Gelco Corp./B.D.C. Ltd., which provides a courier service.
12. Hillbrand Industries Ltd./Terra-Flex Ltd., which designs and manufac-
tures trackmounted off-highway vehicles.
13. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp., The/Marmid Financial Services
Ltd. and M.M. Builders Funds Ltd., 1. which is a holding company and 2.
which is engaged in construction financing.
14. Kaiser Engineers Inc./Henry J. Kaiser Company (Canada) Ltd./La Com-
pagnie Henry J. Kaiser (Canada) Lte, which is a consulting engineering
business.
15. Louisiana-Pacific Canada Ltd./Salmo Forest Products Ltd., which oper-
ates a sawmill.
16. Meadows, Thomas, & Co. Canada Ltd./Allan & Johnston Ltd., which is a
customs broker.
17. National Distillers and Chemical Corp./Emery Industries Ltd., which
sells specialty chemicals.
18. Norton Simon Inc./Avis Transport of Canada Ltd., which rents and
leases cars and trucks.
19. Parker-Hannifin Corp./Joly Engineering Ltd., which manufactures preci-
sion mechanical components.
20. Pentos Ltd./certain assets of The Master's Collection, namely facilities to
publish religious recorded music and to distribute religious musical re-
cords, tapes, and sheet music.
21. Produits Petroliers Champlain Lt6e/retail business of Petrole Moderne
Ltee, which wholesales and/or retails gasoline and fuels.
22. Robin Hood Multifoods Ltd./Fred Martin Agencies Ltd., which imports
sporting goods, supplies, and equipment.
23. Seismograph Service Corporation/Central Development Exploration Ltd.,
which collects seismic data.
24. Unilever United States, Inc./1. Nacan Products Ltd. 2. Lepage's Ltd. 3.
Foodpro National Inc., 1. which produces adhesives, resins, and special-
ity starch products; 2. which produces and sells adhesives and allied
home care products and decoration aids; 3. which produces additives and
imports and sells stabilizers, emulsifiers, natural smoke extracts, and
soya proteins.
25. United Technologies Corp./Otis Elevator Co. Ltd., which manufactures
elevators.
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EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
LAW
Articles 85 and 86, Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
298 U.N.T.S. 4300 (1958).
Synopsis
Multinational enterprises operating in the European Economic Community
come under the ambit of the general competition laws: Articles 85 and 86 of
the Treaty of Rome and subsequent regulations and directives. Article 85
prohibits agreements between undertakings and concerted practices that
may affect trade between member states, and which are designed to prevent
or distort competition in the Common Market. Article 86 prohibits abuse of a
firm's dominant position in a substantial part of the Common Market. Both
articles list examples of the behavior they prohibit.
The Commission of the European Communities (Commission) has pro-
posed a regulation concerning prior notification of mergers of corporations
with turnovers in excess of 1.25 billion units of account. This regulation was
expected to help deal with the competitive threat of multinational corpora-
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tions. The Council of the European Communities (Council) has declined to
adopt the regulation.
The Commission has been working with the OECD to develop guide-
lines for multinational corporations, specifically in the area of service of docu-
ments, enforcement of decisions, and competitive behavior. It has also for-
mulated a regulation that would allow the creation of a European Company-
a community-wide corporation formed under standards promulgated by the
Commission. This regulation has not been adopted by the Council.
The Court of Justice and the Commission have used Articles 85 and 86
of the Treaty of Rome against foreign corporations if these corporations' acts
threaten competition in the Community. Though the Commission has es-
poused the "effects doctrine" as a means of obtaining jurisdiction over for-
eign corporations, the Court of Justice has only allowed jurisdiction over
these firms in two types of circumstances: first, if the foreign corporation acts
directly within the Community to restrain competition; or second, if the
corporation's subsidiary commits an act in restraint of competition within the
Community, and the subsidiary is not wholly independent of the parent.
Article 86, dealing with abuse of dominant position, has been applied to
mergers with at least one firm in the Community where the merger will
distort competition in the Community. This use of Article 86 greatly affects
foreign corporations, since they often engage in such mergers.
The procedure and remedies for competition cases are found in several
Commission regulations. Two regulations are most important. Regulation
17/62 gives the Commission the necessary powers to investigate threats to
competition and to fine those corporations that violate the competition laws.
It also confirms the Court of Justice's jurisdiction under Article 173 to review
Commission decisions in this area.
Article 3 of Regulation 17/62 grants the Commission power to issue
cease and desist orders. Whether this power encompasses divestiture orders
has not been decided by the court of Justice. In Europemballage & Continen-
tal Can Co. v. E.C. Commission, [1973] E.C.R. 215, the court ordered Conti-
nental Can Co. to divest itself of an acquired company because the merger
violated Article 86. However, the court reversed the Commission on the
merits, never reaching the issue of divestiture. The regulation allows both
member states and individuals to bring alleged violations of the competition
laws to the attention of the Commission. Regulation 67/67 grants block ex-
emptions from competition laws in certain circumstances.
In Multinational Undertakings and the Community, BULLETIN OF THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES, No. 15 (Supp. 1973) the Commission
explained its policies toward multinational corporations. It has tried to fit
foreign corporations into the framework of the general competition laws,
according them extra surveillance due to their propensity to harm competi-
tion more than smaller national firms. Although the Commission desires to
work from a free enterprise theory of competition, it realizes that the size of
multinational corporations mandates a considerable degree of control over
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them. The Commission also desires that European firms grow in order to
meet the competitive threat from foreign corporations. The Commission,
however, does not discriminate on the basis of nationality in the application
of competition laws to multinational corporations. The Court of Justice, al-
though allowing the Commission leeway to formulate policy in the area,
insists that standards must be promulgated to protect the rights guaranteed
under the Treaty of Rome.
CASES
Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import-Export S.A., [1971] E.C.R. 949. Belgian
parent company cannot grant the exclusive right of sale of a Japanese
product to its French subsidiary if this harms competition in the
Community.
Imperial Chemical Industries v. E.C. Commission, [19721 E.C.R. 619. Non-
Community firm engaged in price-fixing with various Community
firms claimed the concerted action was carried out by its subsidiary in
the Community. The court ruled it had jurisdiction over the non-
Community parent firm because its subsidiary was not autonomous
from the parent.
Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Co. v. E.C. Commission,
[19731 E.C.R. 215. Continental Can Co., already controlling a substan-
tial share of the Community can market, acquired its leading Dutch
competitor. The court ruled that Article 86, dealing with abuse of
dominant position, can prevent the merger from taking place if it
threatens the product's supply structure.
Commercial Solvents Corp. v. E.C. Commission, [1974] E.C.R. 223. This
case, involving jurisdiction over a U.S. parent firm because of the acts
of its Italian subsidiary, solidifies the court's use of the "economic
unity" theory of jurisdiction.
United Brands Co. v. E.C. Commission, [1978] E.C.R. 207. In this case,
involving certain pricing and distribution practices of the multinational
corporation United Brands concerning the sale of bananas in the Com-
munity, the court held that a corporation cannot seek to eliminate a
competitor if such elimination would have effects on the pattern of
competition in the Common Market.
SECONDARY SOURCES
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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
LAW
Act Against Restraints of Competition (ARC), Third Chapter: Market-
Dominating Enterprises, § § 22-24b.
Synopsis
Prior to the passage of the ARC in 1957, the German legal tradition's theory
of freedom of contract legitimized private restrictive agreements. The first
legislation to address restrictive business practices, the Cartel Ordinance of
1923, granted a generally unexercised power to act against coercive prac-
tices. The period of National Socialism highlighted the Cartel Ordinance's
ineffectiveness as cartels became the compulsory means for obtaining the
government's planned economy objectives.
During the postwar allied occupation, the United States, Britain, and
France each instituted laws against restrictive business practices in accor-
dance with the Potsdam Agreement's mandate to eliminate "excessive con-
centration of German economic power." These laws were replaced in 1957 by
the ARC.
In 1966 the first amendment to the ARC strengthened its enforcement
provisions, especially with respect to vertical agreements and market-
dominating enterprises. In 1973 the second amendment to the ARC instit-
uted stricter abuse control over market-dominating enterprises and certain
mergers. In 1976 the third amendment to the ARC extended merger control
to newspaper enterprises of only local or regional significance.
Currently the legislature is considering a fourth amendment to the ARC
to render more effective the provisions covering merger control, abusive prac-
tices of market-dominating firms, the ban on discrimination, nonbinding
price recommendations, export cartels, and the exempted areas of banking,
insurance, and public utilities.
The ARC applies to all restraints on competition, including mergers,
having an effect on German territory. There are statutory exceptions, such as
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public transportation enterprises, to the application of the statute. However,
the ARC applies to other partly or wholly owned state enterprises unless
there are express provisions to the contrary.
The general provisions of the ARC concerning market-dominating enter-
prises apply to monopolies. Market domination exists if an enterprise is not
exposed to significant competition, or if it occupies a superior market position
as defined by general criteria including the financial resources of the enter-
prise. The Federal Cartel Office (FCO) is authorized to prohibit abusive
market-dominating conduct; it employs the "comparative market" concept as
a test for abusive conduct. Abusive behavior exists if the market-dominating
enterprise acts in a manner that would be impossible if it was exposed to
substantial competition. Demands of specified prices or terms and conditions
of sale are such abusive practices. In addition to prohibiting abusive prac-
tices, the cartel authority may declare the related contracts void. The FCO
can prevent market-dominating enterprises from charging prices exceeding a
specified limit. The FCO, however, cannot itself establish prices, terms, and
conditions in place of the enterprises.
Mergers do not per se restrain competition. ARC Section 24 authorizes
the FCO to prohibit mergers between or among enterprises if the merger is
expected to result in or strengthen a position of market domination. How-
ever, if the participating enterprises prove that the merger's detrimental ef-
fect on competition is outweighed by its overall economic advantages, or is
justified by an overriding public interest, the federal minister of economics
may grant permission for the merger, subject to possible restrictions and
requirements.
The ARC establishes regulatory jurisdiction over mergers through the
"effects" test or theory. Mergers occurring abroad are considered to have
domestic effects if foreign participants have subsidiaries in Germany or if at
least one German enterprise participates in a merger that influences the
structural conditions for domestic competition.
ARC Sections 23 and 24(a) require reporting of most consummated
mergers, as well as certain proposed mergers. These notification requirements
operate independently from the FCO's prohibitory power; that is, notification
can be required although no remedial action will be taken. The FCO can thus
observe concentration activity regardless of the possibility of market domina-
tion. Merged enterprises must notify the FCO if: (1) a domestic market share
of 20 percent is obtained or increased by the merger, or if one of the enter-
prises possesses a 20 percent market share in another market, or (2) the
enterprises during the business year prior to the merger had at least 10,000
combined employees or a combined turnover of at least 500 million DM.
The FCO may prohibit completed mergers only within one year after
notification. A completed merger that the FCO has prohibited is dissolved
unless the federal minister of economics otherwise permits.
Enterprises proposing to merge must notify the FCO if at least two of the
participating enterprises each had sales of 1 billion DM or more during the
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preceding fiscal year. Notification of mergers in the newspaper business is
required if two of the participating enterprises each have sales of 50 million
DM. Mergers not subject to control involve comparatively small enterprises
and markets, or restraints of competition which do not produce an effect in a
substantial part of the Federal Republic of Germany.
An independent Monopoly Commission reviews the information supplied
by merging enterprises, and evaluates the development of enterprise concen-
tration in the Federal Republic of Germany. The Commission issues a report
every two years.
ARC Section 38 specifies that an offense is committed by any person who
willfully or negligently disregards an order of the FCO, violates a prohibition,
or fradulently furnishes or uses incorrect information to influence a prohibi-
tion proceeding of the FCO. The offender may be fined up to 10,000 DM plus
three times the additional revenues realized as a result of the violation.
The ARC's provisions are designed primarily to protect the public inter-
est. Claims by private parties for damages resulting from a violation of the
ARC are allowed under the ARC; however, these claims can only be lodged
against market-dominating enterprises and only if an order issued pursuant
to ARC Section 22 (abusive conduct) is deemed to be directly protective of
individual interests. A damage claim requires a showing that the defendant
acted willfully or negligently in violating the protective order. Injunctive
relief is also available, and it does not require a showing of willful or negli-
gent conduct. These private actions are subject to a three-year statute of
limitations. There is no provision for private actions with regard to mergers.
CASES
WuW/E BGH 1299--"Strombezugspreis." ARC Sections 22-24a do not pro-
tect the individual interests absent an expressly protective order.
WuW/E BGH 1377-"Zementmahlanlage." Established point at which the
acquisition of assets is sufficiently significant to constitute a merger
subject to the reporting requirements.
WuW/E OLG 1467--"BP." Concerns proof of an absence of significant com-
petition between or among oligopolists.
WuW/E BKA 1482; KVR 4/75--"Vitamin B-12." Federal Supreme Court
confirmed the FCO's authority to order lower prices in response to an
abusive market-dominating practice although the specific order here
was overruled.
WuW/E BKA 1517-"Bituman Verkaufsgesellschaft." Merger improved com-
petition by the entrance of a strong competitor which weakened an
existing oligopoly.
WuW/E BKA 1526; WuW/E BGH 1445; WuW/E OLG 1645; KVR 2/76-
"Valium-Librium." FCO order to lower prices overruled.
WuW/E BKA 1571-"Kaiser-VAW." Merger improved competition by result-
ing in an increased number of strong competitors.
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WuW/E OLG 1599; WuW/E BGH 1435--"Vitamin B-12." Federal Supreme
Court recognized the "comparative market" concept for determining
abusive pricing by comparing alleged abusive behavior with behavior
of enterprises exposed to substantial competition.
WuW/E BKA 1625; WuW/E OLG 1745--"Sachs." Strengthening of market-
dominating position occurs if a dominant enterprise would become
part of a concern which has significant financial resources.
WuW/E OLG 1637--"Weichschaum." Enterprise's assurances can avert pro-
hibition order or partial dissolution.
KartV 34/67 of 18 February 1969. Sale conditioned on exclusive five-year
buying agreement, i.e., tying arrangement, is an abuse of a market-
dominating position.
BGHST 24 of 12 July 1973-"Olfeldrohre." Federal Supreme Court held that
the existence or absence of "effects" for application of the ARC must
be judged in connection with the rule of substantive law invoked in
the specific case.
KVR 2/78 of 29 May 1979. Federal Supreme Court held that an acquisition
completed abroad is subject to notification requirements according to
the effects theory and the independent notification procedure of ARC
Section 23.
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Price Ordinance No. 45-1483 of 30 June 1945 as amended, Articles 50-59;
Ordinance No. 45-1484 of 30 June 1945; Penal Code, Article 419; Act No.
77-806 of 19 July 1977.
Synopsis
French economic policy underlies competition policy. The dominant theme
of that policy since World War II has been price control. The Price Ordi-
nance of 1945 was used primarily to fight price increases; it was only
partially considered to be the legal basis for a general policy of maintaining
competition and facilitating the development of free enterprise in a market
economy.
Article 50 of the Price Ordinance No. 45-1483 prohibits activities of
dominant enterprises which may have the effect of interfering with the nor-
mal operation of the market. The minister of the economy may require enter-
prises that have abused a dominant position to amend or annul the acts and
transactions from which the abuse arises. The minister may also require
such enterprises to take necessary steps to reestablish either the status quo
ante or adequate competition. If injunctions issued by the minister are vio-
lated, fines may be assessed against the enterprises. Exemption provisions
are extensively utilized where there has been legislative approval or where
the activities further economic progress as proven by the parties to an agree-
ment. In practice, the law has not been rigorously applied.
There is no system for the notification or registration of restrictive agree-
ments in France. However, restrictive agreements can be investigated at the
administrative level if inquiries are made to the appropriate ministry. The
minister of the economy may refer the matter to the Commission on Compe-
tition (Commission). The Commission may bypass this referral process and
examine the case on its own initiative at the behest of other interested
parties. The Commission may issue an opinion as to the lawfulness of the
practices and make remedial proposals to the minister. The minister of the
economy then decides what measures are to be taken, i.e., closing the case,
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fining the violators, or remitting the case to the Public Prosecutor's Office for
criminal proceedings against the parties.
The French Government encouraged mergers through the 1960s and
into the 1970s as a simple answer to problems created by the small size of
the average French firm in contrast with the large size and innovative prac-
tices of U.S. competitors. European "merger fever" during the 1960s ran
highest in France.
Recently, however, the French government articulated its concern for
the effects of mergers on inflation in the Act No. 77-806 of 19 July 1977.
This Act purports to serve the government's inflation control objectives by
authorizing action against unlawful cartels and abuse of dominant positions
and by introducing some form of control over concentrated operations. The
government's adoption of a policy that gradually frees prices is also signifi-
cant because it changes the direction of competition policy away from price
control, toward the regulation of the structural causes of inflation. The 1977
Act establishes control of mergers above a certain size for the first time in
France. This Act also provides for selective control of concentrated industries
which impede competition without adequately contributing to economic and
social progress. The Act applies to the activities of concentrated enterprises if
such enterprises impede competition and their annual sales exceed 40 per-
cent of domestic consumption on a national market in the case of similar or
substitute goods, products or services, or 25 percent of domestic consump-
tion if such goods are of a different nature and not substitute goods. Mergers
or other agreements between firms that exceed these thresholds may be
prohibited or modified. The Act No. 77-806 established punitive measures to
be taken against unlawful cartels and abuse of dominant positions. With
respect to cartels and market-dominating enterprises, the Act establishes a
system of administrative fines, a procedure for injunctions, and arrange-
ments to encourage interested parties to inform the Commission on Competi-
tion of allegedly illegal arrangements.
Article 53 sets forth sanctions for unlawful cartels and abuse of domi-
nant positions. An enterprise may incur a maximum fine of 5 percent of
turnover for an Article 50 offense or Frs. 5 million in the case of associa-
tions, trade organizations, or commercial interest groups. The minister of
the economy imposes the fine pursuant to the Commission on Competi-
tion's opinion. In cases where settlements are reached, the minister and the
parties may agree to a system of lighter penalties which have a maximum
fine of Frs. 100,000.
The minister may enjoin an enterprise engaged in practices in restraint
of trade. The enterprise may also be ordered to restore competition. For abuse
of dominant position, the minister may order the enterprise to amend or
cancel agreements or to take measure to reestablish adequate competition. If
the enterprise does not comply with the injunction, the minister may impose
a fine. The Commission on Competition may also propose that an Article 50
case be remitted to the Public Prosecutor's Office. If the minister does so it
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enables both a public prosecution and a civil action for damages resulting
from the offense.
To date the government has not aggressively enforced these new con-
centration provisions. However, following enactment of the 1977 Act, the
government published four texts to clarify and bring its provisions into opera-
tion. These texts demonstrate the government's new determination to de-
velop and enforce competition policy.
The Act establishes an optional notification system regarding activities of
concentrated industries. Enterprises can voluntarily notify the minister of the
economy who may either make no objection to the proposed action or who
may refer the matter to the Commission on Competition for further scrutiny.
The Commission may issue an Opinion within the limits of which the appro-
priate minister may require that the enterprises involved take necessary mea-
sures to insure or reestablish adequate competition. Such a decision must be
made within eight months of notification.
Absent voluntary notification, the minister of the economy or the chair-
man of the Commission may order an inquiry to determine whether enter-
prises have concluded any illegal acts or agreements. There is no time limit
for decisions initiated by the government's own inquiry into the nature of a
business concentration.
An appeal lies for abuse of powers from all decisions taken by the gov-
ernment under this Act.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Opinions delivered by the Technical Commission on Combines and Dominant
Positions and by the Competition Commission.
Position Regarding Competition in the Carbon Dioxide Industry and on the
Market for that Product, Official Bulletin No. 15 of the Price Services,
23 August 1969. The Commission found the existence of a dominant
position but no evidence of anticompetitive practices. It recommended
continued careful review of the industry with a conclusion in two years
as to the existence of a cartel or any discriminatory practices.
Boycotting of the Limouzy Haulage Company by the GLAM, Opinion of 18
December 1970, Official Bulletin No. 6 of the Price Services, 17 March
1971. The Commission found the boycott to eliminate Limouzy from
the sheephide processing market had the characteristics of a restraint
of competition. Since no economic benefits resulted from the boycott
and because of mitigating circumstances (Limouzy's objective was to
acquire a quasi-monopoly), the Commission did not subject CLAM to
criminal proceedings.
Practices Restricting Competition among Plastic Bottle Crate Manufactur-
ers, Opinion of 17 March 1971, Official Bulletin No. 19 of the Price
Services, 30 October 1971. The Commission recommended that the
case be referred to the public prosecutor for violating Article 59 bis of
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the Price Ordinance concerning the abuse of a dominant position
through restrictive contracts.
Exclusive Dealing Agreements Involving Exclusive Territorial Rights and
Geographical Allocation of Markets; Concerted Action in Connection
with Public Tenders, Opinion of 8 November 1974, Official Bulletin
No. 5 of the Price Services, 1 February 1975. The Commission con-
sidered the submission of uniform bids upon invitation to tender as
enabling the enterprises grouped within an economic cooperation
group to compete with larger enterprises in regard to national con-
tracts. Thus, the effect was not to restrict or distort competition but to
strengthen it, and the agreements were permitted.
Situation with Regard to Competition in the Distribution of Spectacle
Frames, Opinion of 4 June 1975, Official Bulletin No. 9 of the Price
Services, 13 March 1976. The Commission found the generalized use
by all opticians of a trade price scale, without reference to their true
costs, to be an abusive cartel situation. However, the Commission
recommended that, if a competitive situation did not emerge after
direct retail price control, an information campaign would be launched
to draw consumer's attention to the absence of binding price scales
and the unlawfulness of such price scales. This marks a new direction
for the Commission in allying consumers by keeping them informed of
anticompetitive practices.
Competitive Situation in the Production and Distribution of Sound Record-
ings, Opinion of 17 May 1977, Official Bulletin No. 5 of the Price Ser-
vices, 10 February 1978. Uniform price system violated Art. 59 but was
not a restriction on competition because of the industry's need to expand.
Practices in Restraint of Competition in the Marketing of Non-Refillable
Lighters, Opinion of 11 May 1978, Official Bulletin No. 13 of the Price
Services, 1 June 1978. The Commission imposed heavy fines on three
companies responsible for nearly 80 percent of the distribution of
lighters to tobacconists. The companies had placed restrictions on free-
dom to purchase a small firm's disposable lighter and provisions re-
stricting freedom of marketing. In addition to the fines, the Commis-
sion ordered the companies to cease these practices and revoke all
measures restricting free competition in the trade.
Practices in Restraint of Competition Found to Exist in the Sector of Non-
Skid Tire Studs for Motor Vehicles, Opinion of 8 June 1978, Ministerial
decision of 26 July 1978. Practices in restraint of competition were
found to exist in the sector of nonskid tire studs for motor vehicles. The
Commission held that agreements or practices designed to harmonize
prices violated the prohibition on cartels, and that the companies in
question should renounce all agreements in restraint of competition,
including the exclusive supply provisions. Although the minister did not
refer the case to the public prosecutor, he did require a follow-up report
on the restoration of competition.
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Fair Trading Act, 1973, c. 41, §§ 1-11, 44-56, 63-76.
Synopsis
The Fair Trading Act of 1973 is the major law governing mergers and the
exercise of monopoly power in Great Britain. It defines monopoly as an enter-
prise that occupies 25 percent of the market. The Act also created an Office
of Fair Trading that is headed by an independent director general responsible
only to Parliament. The director general is empowered to make monopoly and
oligopoly references to the newly named Monopolies and Mergers Commis-
sion (Commission), though only the Board of Trade can refer mergers to the
Commission. The Act also implemented provisions concerning consumer
protection, restrictive labor practices, and pyramid selling. Further, it ex-
tended the registration requirements of the 1956 and 1968 Restrictive Prac-
tices Acts to services; thus, all restrictive agreements and information agree-
ments affecting the product and service markets come under the scrutiny of
the Monopolies Commission. The secretary of state and the director general
of fair trading each have power to refer scale and complex monopoly situa-
tions to the Commission for investigation and report. A scale monopoly may
exist when one person, company, or group of interconnected companies sup-
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plies or acquires at least one-quarter of the market share in a particular
market for goods or services. A complex monopoly may exist when at least
one-quarter of the market share in a particular market for goods or services
are supplied by or sold to two or more persons, unconnected companies or
group of companies who prevent or restrict competition in the supply of
goods or services.
If the director general determines that a monopoly situation exists, or
may exist, he can refer it to the Commission for investigation. Any such
reference must relate to the supply of all goods or services of a particular
description; it cannot relate to the activities of a named person, company, or
companies. The Commission cannot investigate a monopoly situation unless
the matter has been formally referred to it.
A monopoly reference requires the Commission to consider whether, in
fact, a monopoly situation exists. If the Commission determines one does
exist, it must decide, first, who is favored by the situation; second, whether
the favored persons are taking steps to exploit or maintain the situation; and
third, whether any of the favored persons' acts or omissions are attributable
to the existence of the monopoly situation. Also, the Commission examines
whether the monopoly situation operates against the public interest and how
that aspect can be remedied.
When the Commission reports that a monopoly situation exists and
operates against the public interest, the minister of the appropriate state
and industry may, by order, give effect to the report. In so doing, the
minister takes into account any recommendations of the Commission and
the advice of the director general. Noncompliance with an order is not a
criminal offense. Individuals or the Crown may enforce orders by bringing a
civil action "for an injunction or interdict or for any other appropriate re-
lief." The director general is responsible for monitoring merger activities in
order to identify situations that qualify for investigation. Mergers qualify for
investigation if, first, two or more enterprises merge and cease to be dis-
tinct; second, at least one of the enterprises does business in the United
Kingdom or is under the control of a corporation incorporated in the United
Kingdom; third, the merger has occurred within six months; and fourth,
the enterprises are both engaged in supply of goods or services of the same
description, and either have between them at least one-quarter of the mar-
ket for those goods or services, or the gross value of the assets taken over
exceeds £5 million.
A merger may only be referred to the Commission by the secretary of
state on the advice of the director general. The Commission is directed to
consider any relevant matter, but the following matters are mentioned in the
legislation for guidance: competition, the interests of the consumer, costs
and innovation, a balanced distribution of industry and employment in the
United Kingdom, and the export market. All merger reports must be pub-
lished and presented to Parliament. If a report is made with adverse findings,
the secretary of state may ask the director general to negotiate assurances
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from the parties as to their future conduct. Also, the secretary may prohibit a
proposed merger or dissolve an existing merger.
The new U.K. Competition Bill (now in the committee stage in the
House of Commons) contemplates selective investigation and control of prac-
tices which have, or are intended or likely to have "the effect of restricting,
distorting or preventing competition in connection with the production, sup-
ply or acquisition of goods in the United Kingdom or any part of it or the
supply or securing of services in the United Kingdom or any part of it."
It empowers the director general to carry out preliminary investigations
of conduct that may have this effect. Following an investigation, the director
general will publish his findings. If he identifies an anticompetitive practice,
he may request the Commission to investigate further and report whether
the practice is against the public interest; as an alternative, the director
general may accept a voluntary remedy (undertaking) from the enterprise
relating to the practice. Following adverse findings by the Commission, the
secretary of state may ask the director general to seek an undertaking from
the enterprise or he may make an order prohibiting the particular practice or
remedying its adverse effects.
The Competition Bill also provides, in part, for a new investigative
method of scrutinizing activities of nationalized industries and certain other
bodies. Additionally, it enables the secretary of state to require the director
general to investigate prices or charges of major public concern.
The Competition Bill is expected to be out of the committee stage by
March, 1980.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS: MONOPOLIES
Supply of Chlordiazepoxide and Diazepam (Librium and Valium); 899 H.C.
DEB. (1975-76) 12 November 1975, col. 1543-47. In 1973, Parlia-
ment ordered a 40 percent decrease in the price of Librium and a 25
percent decrease in the price of Valium. In settlement negotiations,
Roche agreed to pay the government approximately £3% million in
excess profits from 1970-73, to participate in a voluntary price regula-
tion scheme, and to reduce the price of Valium and Librium to one-
half their 1970 level.
Supply of Building Bricks; 913 H.C. DEB. (1975-76) 17 June 1976, col.
221-23. One manufacturer supplying more than one-third of the
building market, was found not to operate against the public interest.
Barrister's Services-the supply by her Majesty's Counsel alone of their ser-
vices, and Advocate's services-the supply by Senior Counsel alone of
their services; 914 H.C. DEB. (1975-76) 7 July 1976, col. 543-45.
Restrictions requiring senior and junior counsel for certain actions were
deemed to create a monopoly operating against the public interest.
Restrictions of Advertising by Solicitors, Advocates and Barristers; 916 H.C.
DEB. (1975-76) 29 July 1976, col. 320-24. Advertising prohibitions
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for solicitors created a monopoly situation operating against the public
interest. The prohibitions restricted entry to the field and decreased
competition and efficiency. The minister asked the director general to
discuss with the relevant professional bodies the implementation of
new rules.
Restrictions on Advertising by Veterinary Surgeons, Stockbrokers and Ac-
countants; 916 H.C. DEB. (1975-76) 6 Aug. 1976, col. 1209-15. Re-
strictions on advertising created a monopoly situation that operated
against the public interest. The minister asked the director general to
consult with the appropriate professional bodies to implement the
Commission's recommended rules and safeguards.
Revised Undertakings Given by Oil Companies Regarding Retail Supply of
Petrol; 916 H.C. DEB. (1975-76) 3 August 1976. Pursuant to the
minister's request, the director general obtained comprehensive agree-
ments from the oil companies regulating supply agreements for vari-
ous petrol products and leases and licenses of company filling stations.
Supply of Diazonium Sensitized Copying Materials; 927 H.C. DEB. (1976-
77) 2 March 1977, col. 191-93. One company supplied over 50 per-
cent of the U.K. market but the Commission determined the monopoly
was not operating against the public interest. However, the Commis-
sion discovered twenty-two industry-wide restrictive agreements that
had not been registered and were subsequently terminated.
Supply of Cat and Dog Foods; 935 H.C. DEB. (1976-77) 20 July 1977, col.
543-44. Two companies each controlled more than 25 percent of the
market, but their profits, prices, and efficiency indicated the monopo-
lies did not operate against the public interest.
Supply of Frozen Foodstuffs for Human Consumption; 919 H.C. DEB.
(1975-76) 10 November 1976, col. 165-66. One company supplied
over one-quarter of frozen foodstuffs in the U.K. The Commission
found the company was efficient and its prices were not excessive.
However, it recommended discontinuance of the company's practice of
giving discounts to retailers for reserving space in freezers.
Supply of Indirect Electrostatic Reprographic Equipment; 922 H.C. DEB.
(1976-77) 16 December 1976, col. 744-78. Rank Xerox Ltd. supplied
at least one-third of the market. Though the Commission found the
company generally not be operating against the public interest, it criti-
cized certain of Xerox's practices, including group discounts. Xerox
remedied some of the criticized practices, and the minister asked the
director general to consult with Xerox to end the others.
Supply of Wheat Flour and Bread Made from Wheat Flour; 935 H.C. DEB.
(1976-77) 14 July 1977, col. 261-62. Three companies required their
flour-using subsidiaries to buy flour from the group's own mills. This
foreclosed 51 percent of the market and the Commission determined it
was done to restrict competition. However, the Commission concluded
that effective competition existed to the extent allowed by the substan-
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tial statutory control of the industry and that the situation did not
operate against the public interest. The Commission discovered
twenty-two restrictive trade agreements that had not been registered
and these were subsequently abandoned.
Wholesaling of Newspapers and Periodicals; Press Notice, Department of
Press and Consumer Protection, June 1, 1978. Wholesale suppliers of
national newspapers and periodicals refused to supply certain retailers.
Though this constituted a complex monopoly situation, the Commis-
sion determined it was cost-efficient for wholesalers to limit the num-
ber of retailers they supplied and to select them on the basis of location
and service standards.
Supply and Export of Ceramic Sanitaryware; Press Notice, Department of
Prices and Consumer Protection, August 31, 1978. One company and
its wholly owned subsidiary controlled over 25 percent of the domestic
market. However, its profits were not excessive and price similarity in
the industry reflected effective competition. Thus, the Commission
determined the monopoly did not operate against the public interest.
Control of 31 percent of the export market was found not to operate
against the public interest because of competition from the interna-
tional market.
MERGERS
Amalgamated Industrials Limited; 912 H.C. DEB. (1975-76) 26 May 1976,
col. 274-75. The Commission found a consummated merger to be con-
trary to the public interest. It restricted the acquired company's pro-
gress, lessened the company's contribution to the balance of payments,
and caused serious labor problems. The minister asked the director
general to consult with the acquiring company to limit its holdings to no
more than 10 percent of the stock of the acquired company.
Pilkington Brothers Ltd./U.K. Optical and Industrial Holdings Ltd.; 928
H.C. DEB. (1976-77) 24 March 1977, col. 590. The Commission ex-
pected the merger to operate against the public interest because of
decreased incentive to meet the needs of the domestic market for glass
and plastic lenses, and decreased ability to compete on the interna-
tional market. The secretary of state asked the director general to
obtain an undertaking from Pilkington Brothers to refrain from any
merger activity with U.K. Optical.
Babcox & Wilcox Ltd./Herbert Morris Ltd., 926 H.C. DEB. (1976-77) 23
February 1977, col. 571-73. Three members of the Commission deter-
mined the acquisition would be against the public interest, and recom-
mended limiting Babcox's holdings in Herbert Morris to 10 percent.
However, the secretary of state took no action on the report.
The British Petroleum Company Ltd./Century Oil Group Ltd.; Press Notice,
Department of Prices and Consumer Protection, May 31, 1977. The
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Commission determined the merger would be against the public inter-
est because it might restrict development of Century's refining activity,
tend to decrease price competition and customer-oriented research,
and end the largest independent producer of lubricants in the U.K.
The director general received an undertaking from British Petroleum
to refrain from any merger activity with Century Oils.
Rockware Group Ltd./Redfern National Glass Ltd.; United Glass
Ltd./Redfern National Glass Ltd.; Annual Report of the Director Gen-
eral of Fair Trading, 1978, at 93-94. The Commission expected both
mergers to operate against the public interest by diminishing competi-
tion and domestic supply and increasing imports. The director general
was asked to seek, and did receive, undertakings from the companies
to forego the proposed mergers.
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IRELAND
LAW
Restrictive Trade Practices Act (No. 11 of 1972), Acts of the Oireachtas, 553.
Synopsis
The Restrictive Practices Act of 1972, and the orders promulgated pursuant
to it, provide a comprehensive system of investigation and control of market-
dominating enterprises and monopolies. Section 4 of the Act empowers the
Restrictive Practices Commission to establish rules to insure the fair supply
and distribution of goods. These rules are not enforceable, and depend on
voluntary compliance. However, § 8 of the Act empowers .the minister of
industry and commerce (minister) to issue fair trade orders that are legally
enforceable. Section 19 provides courts jurisdiction to enforce orders. Section
20 declares that anyone who contravenes an order is guilty of an offense.
Offenses are defined in § 23; they range from fines of £100 to £5000 and
imprisonment for up to six months.
The third schedule to the Act sets forth categories of individual or group
practices that violate the Act, including: unjust elimination of competitors,
restrictions of the supply of goods, creation of barriers to entry, territorial
division of markets, private monopolization, and all other acts or agreements
that "operate against the common good or are not in accordance with the
principles of social justice."
Sections 13 through 16 of the Act establish and define the functions of
the Examiner of Restrictive Practices. The examiner is appointed by the
minister. The examiner investigates any aspect of: (a) the supply and distri-
bution of goods or the provision of a service, (b) the operation of an order
under the Act; or (c) the operation of Fair Practice Rules. Where a potential
trade abuse is found it must be submitted in a report to the Restrictive
Practices Commission or the minister.
Section 5 empowers the Restrictive Practices Commission to conduct
inquiries into unfair trade practices at the request of the minister or exa-
miner. It may also conduct an inquiry on application by a private party who
lodged a prior request with the examiner that was denied. In conducting an
inquiry, the Commission may summon witnesses and order discovery. Sec-
tion 8 requires the Commission to report its findings and recommendations
to the minister. To remedy an abuse, the Commission may establish fair
practice rules, or the minister may declare legally enforceable restrictive
practice orders.
Comprehensive Orders governing supply and distribution in eleven in-
dustries were issued through 1976.
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CASES
Report of the Board of Examiner: Motor Spirit, 1971; Restrictive Practices
(Motor Spirit) Order, No. 18 of 1972, No. 15 of 1975. In April 1970,
the Commission, at the request of the minister, announced an inquiry
into retail outlets for motor spirits. The Commission learned that com-
pany stations accounted for 31 percent of total motor spirit sales, and
that three major companies accounted for a high proportion of sales
through company outlets. The Commission recommended, in part,
that there should be a halt to the growth of new company outlets for
three years to permit freer entry into the market. The minister issued
an order that incorporated the recommendation, and the order was
renewed, with slight modification, in 1975.
Report of Examiner: Iron and Steel Scrap, 1972. A government-owned steel
company held a monopoly position for certain types of steel. It used a
graduated rate scale that resulted in its supplies being channeled
through a single supplier. This forces all scrap dealers to deal through
only that supplier. The Commission concluded that "it is impossible to
justify, in a protected market for scrap, the range and composition of the
graduated price scale" adopted by the steel company for its purchases.
This procedure created "a formidable and unnecessary barrier to entry
into trade in scrap with the company, foster[ed] a monopoly in merchant
scrap sales to the company," and served to create a situation in the trade
which "seriously impedes free and fair competition." The Commission
recommended revision in the purchase scale for scrap, and removal of
the sole supplier of scrap from the steel company's board. The minister
accepted these recommendations. Enforcement by order was not neces-
sary because the government controlled the steel company.
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ISRAEL
LAW
Restrictive Trade Practices Law 5719-1929; as amended in 1973.
Synopsis
The Israeli antitrust statute prohibits anticompetitive agreements between
enterprises and provides for control of concentrated industries through min-
isterial discretion.
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Arrangements that restrict competition, whether undertaken by a formal
cartel or pursuant to an implicit agreement within an industry, are illegal
unless exempted by statute or sanctioned by the Restrictive Trade Practices
Board. Violations are criminal offenses and parties to the agreement are
subject to private tort liability. Tacit consent to an agreement, combined with
an interest in its operation, is sufficient to establish an individual as a party.
Agreements negotiated by trade unions, by agricultural marketing or-
ganizations, by conglomerates with their subsidiaries, as well as those involv-
ing intellectual property, international air, or sea carriage (where the minister
of transport has been consulted), or exclusive dealing between suppliers and
resellers are afforded statutory exemption. Parties involved in other agree-
ments must register as cartels with the Board and determine their effect on
the public interest. While the statute provides that the Board should refer to
considerations set forth in the British Restrictive Practices Act of 1956 as
indicative, nonexhaustive, criteria for this determination, applicants bear the
burden of demonstrating that the benefits of cartelization to the public as a
whole outweigh any damage that will result to identifiable sections of the
society. An autonomous government official, the controller of restricted trade
practices, is charged with representing the public interest before the Board.
Cartels may be granted provisional, temporary, conditional, or partial authori-
zation. All dispositions may be modified or cancelled by subsequent decisions
of the Board and are subject to review by the Supreme Court.
The minister of commerce has discretionary power to declare that a
particular industry has reached a level of concentration sufficient to justify
government control of the entire industry. The level of concentration is not
defined with reference to control of the relevant market by several firms.
Rather, it is defined with reference to the size of the largest "commercial
unit" in that market. Commercial unit is defined as "a single corporation; a
corporation and its subsidiaries; the several subsidiaries of a single corpora-
tion; several corporations with predominantly interlocking directorates; a cor-
poration and its controlling interests; or several corporations controlled by a
single interest."
Once the minister of commerce and industry determines an industry's
concentration level is monopolistic, that industry becomes subject to ministe-
rial control with regard to the price, quality, and amount or method of pro-
duction. Such control is imposed in response to proposals by the controller of
restrictive trade practices, based upon findings that the existence of monop-
oly has led to unsatisfactory economic results.
Dispositions by the Restrictive Trade Practices Control Board create no
stare decisis effect upon subsequent applications. However, some fairly con-
sistent principles of decision are discernible.
The attainment of lower prices is considered to be inherently in the public
interest so long as agreements which facilitate this do not interfere with other
policy goals. Price stabilization, however, is not a public interest goal in itself.
Furthermore, provision for public supervision of price increases is insufficient
justification for agreements which tend to eliminate competition. Assertions
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that a cartel will improve efficiency, quality, or service must be supported by
substantial evidence, including a showing of the degree of cartelization neces-
sary to attain the projected benefits. That a cartel agreement would insure the
continued existence of an advantageous branch of the Israeli economy will not
justify registration where the agreement could do so only by protecting firms
that are inefficient or that are threatened with the technological obsolescence
of their capital plants, even where there exists a government policy encourag-
ing investment in the affected industry. Government initiated or approved
export cartel plans through which industry members levy charges upon do-
mestic sales to fund export subsidies have been approved. Other assertions of
export benefit, however, may be dismissed as de minimis or as requiring the
imposition of disproportionate cost upon consumers.
CASES
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JAPAN
LAW
Law concerning the Prohibition of Private Monopolization and the Preserva-
tion of Fair Trade (Antimonopoly Act), Law No. 54 of 1947, as amended by
Acts Nos. 214 of 1949, 259 of 1953, and 63 of 1977.
Synopsis
Japan's Antimonopoly Act of 1947 is modeled after U.S. antitrust legislation.
Enacted under the auspices of the Occupation Forces, the Antimonopoly Act
was designed to be the basic law governing industry, and, as such, to provide
the legal foundation for a strong free enterprise system. The Antimonopoly
Act controls private monopolization, unreasonable restraints of trade, stock-
holding, interlocking directorates, mergers which may substantially restrain
competition, and unfair business practices. However, the numerous exemp-
tions subsequently enacted restrict the application of the statute in several
industries. The Antimonopoly Act is administered by the Fair Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) which exercises its powers independently, although it is adminis-
tratively attached to the prime minister's office.
The Act's history demonstrates that its enforcement in Japan has dif-
fered markedly from antitrust enforcement in the United States. For ex-
ample, private antitrust actions for money damages have as yet played little
role in the Act's enforcement. Furthermore, there have been only four crimi-
nal actions since 1947 against violators under Section 73, which permits the
FTC to file an accusation with the public prosecutor when it determines the
Act has been violated.
The Antimonopoly Act proscribes"... private monopolization, unreason-
able restraint of trade and unfair business practices, by preventing the exces-
sive concentration of economic power and by eliminating unreasonable re-
straint of production, sale, price, [and] technology,.. . through combinations,
[and] agreements, .... " Section 3 prohibits an entrepreneur from effecting a
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private monopoly or engaging in unreasonable restraints of trade, although
private monopolization is not a per se violation of the Act. Section 6 extends
the statutory provisions to international trade; Section 8 lists activities which
trade associations may not undertake; and Section 13 places restriction on
interlocking directorates. Up to 1977, the FTC took action in six cases of
private monopolization.
Section 2(5) defines a prohibited private monopolization as "business
activities by which any entrepreneur, either individually, or in combination
with, or in conspiracy with other entrepreneurs or in any other manner,
excludes or controls the business activities of other entrepreneurs thereby
causing a substantial restraint of trade contrary to the public interest." The
Tokyo High Court has stated that any substantial restraint of trade is inher-
ently contrary to the public interest.
Sections 10 (restriction on acquisition of stock), 15 (restriction on
mergers or consolidations), and 16 ( restriction on acquisition of assets)
prohibit mergers or acquisitions of businesses where the effect may be
substantially to restrain competition in any field of trade or where unfair
business practices have been employed. Proposed mergers or acquisitions
must be reported to the FTC thirty days in advance of the transaction. The
FTC must act within the thirty-day period if it determines that the proposed
transaction violates the above prohibition and should be enjoined. These
sections, unlike the provisions concerning private monopolization under
Section 2(5), require only the probability of a substantial restraint of trade
to prohibit a merger or acquisition. However, the FTC has not been particu-
larly active in the merger area. In the few cases that have arisen, none of
the proposed mergers have been prohibited.
The Yawata-Fuji Merger Case in 1968 has been the most controversial
merger case to date. The Yawata Steel Company and the Fuji Steel Com-
pany, which had constituted the Japan Steel Company prior to World War II,
sought to reconstitute the Japan Steel Company and restore the prewar sta-
tus quo. The FTC initiated proceedings to block the merger alleging substan-
tial restraints of competition in four product areas. The two companies pro-
posed a compromise whereby they would make a partial transfer of their
facilities to their competitors and give technical assistance to their competi-
tors. A consent decision was accepted by the FTC permitting the merger on
that basis.
The Antimonopoly Act has been amended on three occasions, the most
recent in May 1977, when, for the first time in the history of Japanese
competition policy, the Diet passed an amendment which strengthened the
Antimonopoly Act. Included in the 1977 amendments are new provisions
relating to surcharges on profits by illegal cartels; structural controls provid-
ing for regulation of industries where an enterprise holds a 50 percent mar-
ket share or two enterprises hold a 75 percent market share, and where the
economic performance of the industry has been unsatisfactory; establish-
ment of a reporting system for enterprises participating in parallel price in-
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creases; FTC hearing procedures; reinstitution of restrictions on stockhold-
ing by large corporations or financial companies; and an increase in maxi-
mum criminal fines for a violation of the Act.
The Antimonopoly Act empowers the FTC, a quasi-judicial agency mo-
deled after the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, to enforce the Act's provi-
sions. There are three ways in which a violation may be brought to the
attention of the FTC. First, any person having knowledge of a violation may
request the FTC to take appropriate measures to remedy the illegality. How-
ever, the FTC retains discretion as to whether it should commence proceed-
ings on the basis of such a report. Second, the public prosecutor may file a
report with the FTC when a violation is discovered, although this procedure
is seldom used in practice. Third, the FTC can commence an ex officio
investigation.
If it becomes clear from an FTC investigation that a violation exists, the
FTC may either recommend that the violator refrain from its illegal conduct
or it may institute formal proceedings against the violator. If the concerned
party accepts the FTC recommendation, a decision is issued on that basis
without formal trial. If the FTC initiates formal proceedings, a trial takes
place in which FTC investigators bring their findings before administrative
law judges. During the trial the defendant may accept both the investigators'
facts and the application of law to those facts as presented in the FTC's
complaint, but contest the FTC's proposed remedies. If the Commission
agrees to modify its proposed abatement measures, the trial is terminated and
a consent decision is issued. If neither a recommendation nor a consent
decision is issued, a decision is rendered upon completion of a formal trial.
Therefore, three types of decisions may result from an FTC investigation:
recommendation decisions, consent decisions, and formal decisions. All three
types of decisions are legally binding, and violation of a decision is an offense
punishable by imprisonment or fine.
A defendant whose conduct has been found to be illegal may appeal the
FTC decision to the Tokyo High Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over
FTC decisions. The FTC's findings of fact are binding on the Tokyo High
Court and the introduction of new evidence is generally not allowed. An FTC
decision is subject to reversal if it is not based on substantial evidence or if it
is found to be unconstitutional, in which case, the Court may remand the
case to the FTC for further proceedings. Through 1977, thirty-one cases had
been appealed to the court and in fifteen cases, the FTC's decision was
affirmed.
Violations of the Antimonopoly Act are subject not only to the various
orders rendered by the FTC including, for example, orders under a 1977
provision for disgorgement of profits gained by cartel participants through
illegal activities, but also to criminal penalties. Private monopolization and
unreasonable restraint of trade are the violations for which the heaviest
penalty is imposed-imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine of
not more than 5 million yen. However, criminal proceedings are initiated
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only upon accusation by the FTC so that alleged violations can be judged by
FTC personnel having special economic and expert knowledge.
Section 25 of the Act also provides money damages for private actions.
Any person who has been injured because of a violation of the Act is entitled
to indemnification for actual damages. The claim for damages under the Act
can only be made after a final decision, in which case the FTC's decision is
conclusive evidence of the illegality of the defendant's conduct. To date, only
three private actions have been concluded. If no FTC decision has been
issued with regard to the particular conduct, an injured party may still bring
an action under § 709 of the Civil Code, which authorizes general tort
claims.
Chapter 6 of the Antimonopoly Act sets forth exceptions to the Act for
certain acts of public utility enterprises, rights exercised under the patent,
copyright, and tradmark acts, and acts of various cooperatives. In addition,
land transportation, insurance, and certain other activities are exempted from
the Antimonopoly Act by virtue of the "Act concerning Exemption from the
Application of the Act concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Main-
tenance of Fair Trade." Shipping cartels also are exempted from the Anti-
monopoly Act by virtue of the Marine Transportation Act of 1949.
The 1953 amendments to the Antimonopoly Act exempted certain de-
pression cartels and rationalization cartels. Separate exemption laws also
were enacted about this time. These exemption laws include the "Export
Trading Act of 1952" (now the "Export and Import Trading Act") and the
"Temporary Measures Act of 1952 concerning the Stabilization of Specific
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises" (replaced by the "Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprises Organization Act of 1957"). Today, in such industries as
coal, machinery, and textiles, other statutes permit specific rationalization
cartels to be formed in conjunction with particular promotional programs of
government agencies. But, the number of exemption cartels has been de-
creasing yearly, from 1,040 in 1965, to 788 in 1978, and 492 in 1979.
CASES
Toho Co. Ltd. v. Fair Trade Commission, Tokyo High Court Decision of
September 19, 1951. Contract for the lease of cinemas.
Toho Co. Ltd. and Another v. Fair Trade Commission, Tokyo High Court
Decision of December 7, 1953. Exclusive dealing agreement between
two companies for distribution of motion pictures.
Noda Shoyu Co. v. Fair Trade Commission, Tokyo High Court Decision of
December 25, 1957. Private monopolization.
Miyagewa v. Gifu Shoko Shinyohumiai, Supreme Court Decision of June 20,
1977. Abuse of predominant position.
Ohkawa et al. v. Matsushita Electric Co., Tokyo High Court Decision of
September 19, 1977. Private action requesting money damages for
resale price maintenance.
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Case of Idemitsu Kosan and 26 others, Tokyo High Court, formal proceed-
ings initiated May 28, 1974. Criminal action for price fixing.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Leading decisions of the Fair Trade Commission.
Case of the Yuasa Timber Co. Ltd. and 64 Others, Decision of August 30,
1949. Horizontal price fixing of plywood.
Case of the Noda Shoyu Co. Ltd. and 4 Others, Decision of April 4, 1952.
Horizontal price fixing of soy sauce.
Case of the Snow Brand Dairy Co. Ltd. and 3 Others, Decision of July 28,
1956. Private monopolization concerning fresh milk.
Case of the Nippon Gakki Co. Ltd., Recommendation Decision of January 30,
1957. Illegal acquisition of stock by a musical instrument manufactur-
ing company.
Case of the Mitsubishi Bank Ltd., Recommendation Decision of June 3,
1957. Abuse of dominant bargaining position by a financial institution.
Case of the Yawata/Fuji Merger, Consent Decision of October 30, 1969.
Restraints of competition in a particular field of trade by merger.
Case of Toyo Seikan Kaisha Co. Ltd., Recommendation Decision of Septem-
ber 18, 1972. Private monopolization by shareholding.
Case of Hiroshima Railway Co. Ltd. and 4 Others, Consent Decision of July
17, 1973. Stockholding and interlocking directorates.
Case of Idemitsu Kosan Co. Ltd. and 11 Others, Recommendation Decision
of February 22, 1974. Horizontal price fixing, quantitative restriction
on petroleum sales.
Case of the Petroleum Association, Recommendation Decision of February
22, 1974. Quantitative restrictions on petroleum sales.
Case of the Chubu Yomiuri Newspaper Co. Ltd., Consent Decision of Novem-
ber 24, 1977. Sales at unreasonably low prices.
Case of the Gunma Asano Concrete Co. Ltd. and 5 Others, Recommendation
Decision of June 5, 1978. First surcharge case; price fixing.
Case of Mitsukoshi, Formal proceedings were initiated on May 14, 1979.
Abuse of dominant position.
Case of Komatsu Co. Ltd., Bucyrus-Erie Co., Formal proceedings initiated on
October 12, 1979. First extraterritorial antitrust case; abuse of domi-
nant position.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Ariga, International Trade of Japan and the Antimonopoly Act, 9 J. INT'L L.
& EcON. 185-201 (1973).
Ariga and Reke, The Antimonopoly Law of Japan and Its Enforcement, 39
WASH. L. REV. 437 (1964).
E. HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JAPAN (1970).
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J.H. IYORI, ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION IN JAPAN (1969).
K. KYOKAI (FAIR TRADE INSTITUTE), ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION OF JAPAN
(1977).
Matsushita, The Antimonopoly Law of Japan in FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION,
MATERIALS FOR REGISTRANTS: US-JAPAN TRADE LAW CONFERENCE,
June 6-7, 1979 (1979).
OECD, COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS
PRACTICES (1978).
OECD, GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES (1968).
Sawada and Brown, American Japanese Antitrust Law, 2 INT'L L. BULL. 13
(1963).
TRADE BULLETIN CORPORATION, JAPAN INDUSTRY SERIES: JAPAN'S
ANTIMONOPOLY POLICY IN LEGISLATIVE AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE,
Vol. XX (1968).
Yamamura, The Development of Antimonopoly Policy in Japan: The Erosion




Constitution Article 28 (Mex.); Organic Law Associated with Article 28, 85
D.O. 1161 (August 31, 1934); Regulations to the Organic Law, 88 D.O. 112
(February 1, 1936); Codigo Penal Article 253 (Mex.); Codigo Civil Article
1910 (Mex.).
Synopsis
Article 28 of the Constitution of 1917 states:
The law shall punish severely and the authorities shall effectively
prosecute every concentration or association in one or a few hands of
goods of primary necessity for the purpose of obtaining a rise in prices;
every act or proceeding which prevents or tends to prevent free compe-
tition... every agreement or combination, in whatever manner it may
be made, to prevent competition.., and to compel consumers to pay
exaggerated prices; and in general, whatever constitutes an exclusive
and undue advantage in favor of one or more specified persons and to
the prejudice of the public in general or of any social class.
Constitutionally-established exceptions include labor union activity, author-
ized associations of producers selling directly in foreign markets, and speci-
fied state-created monopolies (telegraph, postal service, federal banks, etc.).
The 1934 Organic Law adopted pursuant to Article 28 of the Constitu-
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tion forbids the existence of monopolies, defined in Article 3 of the Organic
Law as any situation deliberately created which allows one or more persons
to fix prices or set quotas on services with resulting injury to the general
public or a specified social class. Under Article 4 a rubuttable presumption of
the existence of monopoly is raised by any concentration of goods of neces-
sary consumption, any price-fixing agreement or combination made without
authorization or regulation from the government, or any commercial or in-
dustrial situation willfully created to fix prices on goods or set quotas on
services. The 1936 regulations to the Organic Law provide that government
authorization will generally be granted to price-fixing agreements or combi-
nations if the organization seeking authorization can demonstrate that the
proposed agreement will result in any of the following: integration of an
industry line permitting price reductions, suppression of intermediaries to
obtain less costly distribution, elimination of one or more goods from product
lines without unjustly raising prices, creation of a competitor, reduction of
commercial activities because they have ceased to be economically useful to
the public, adoption of quality control rules or ethical standards, exportation
of goods without prejudice to national consumption, adoption of cost-
minimizing production and distribution techniques, or any other activities
which by their nature demonstrate it is not their aim to impose prices that
harm the public.
The Organic Law defines other conditions that raise a presumption
concerning activity which "tends" to be a monopoly. Since these conditions
show only a tendency toward monopolization, the penalty is one-half that of
an Article 4 violation. Under Article 5 these conditions include the importa-
tion of goods which may result in unfair competition, unauthorized volun-
tary destruction of goods to raise prices by lowering supply, unregulated
benefits to consumers such as rebates, and sales of goods below cost. How-
ever, sales of goods below cost is allowed if the goods are new on the
market, the market price is below cost, or the goods are sold at an auction
or bankruptcy proceeding.
The Organic Law excepts from the definition of a monopoly any author-
ized industrial or public services operating under official price schedules and
any industries in which the government participates as shareholder or
partner.
The Organic Law establishes a fine of 100 to 10,000 pesos for persons
who violate Article 1. In the case of continued unlawful conduct a new
sanction will be imposed every day. In addition to this penalty, the federal
executive, together with the National Council on Economics, is empowered
to take steps to restore competitive market conditions by fixing maximum
prices on goods, forcing the sale of goods held off the market, forcing the
furnishing of withheld services, and promoting competition by granting sub-
sidies or franchises.
The federal executive is also empowered to take action pursuant to the
decreed Powers of the Federal Executive in Economic Matters, Feb. 1 D.O.
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1936, which grants regulatory authority to the federal executive without
specific reference to antitrust. This law applies to business activity related to
certain types of merchandise such as goods of necessary consumption, raw
materials, and products of fundamental industries. Luxury item industries
are specifically excluded from the scope of this law. The decree empowers
the federal executive to impose maximum prices on goods, force the sale of
goods held from the market, regulate the distribution of goods to avoid un-
necessary intermediary steps, regulate imports and exports, force raw mate-
rial producers to satisfy domestic demand before exporting, and impose ra-
tioning and priority systems when a product's demand exceeds its supply.
Persons who violate this law face fines of 100 to 20,000 pesos or confinement
for ninety days.
Alternatively, a plaintiff may seek remedies through provisions in the
Penal Code. Article 253 of the Penal Code of the Federal District of Mexico
punishes the following acts with up to nine years imprisonment and a fine of
up to 150,000 pesos: monopolizing goods of primary necessity with the intent
to obtain price increases by restricting the flow of goods; impairing competi-
tion by creating barriers to entry; restricting output of goods with intent to
obtain higher prices; exporting goods without authorization; selling goods of
primary necessity for excessive profits or any other acts which violate the
provisions of Article 28 of the Constitution. In addition, a court may order
suspension of operation for one year or the dissolution of the enterprise.
Under Article 30 of the Penal Code, a plaintiff can seek restitution and
indemnification for any damage caused to him.
Either individuals or the National Council on Economics, representing
the government, can initiate an antitrust action. The National Council on
Economics, a federal agency, is in charge of regulating national economic
matters including trade and more specifically any illegal monopoly activity.
The provisions of the Civil and Penal Codes and the Organic Law of Article
28 of the Constitution do not preempt but supplement each other. Therefore
all three statutory provisions are channels available to the plaintiff.
CASES
Amparo Administrativo en Revision Promovide por Estevez Adelfonso, 43
Seminario 781, 786 (1935).
Amparo Civil Directo promovide por miguel Kuri Awad, 108 Seminario 1655
(1951).
Amparo Administrativo in Revision promovido por Mexican Petroleum Com-
pany, 57 Seminario 818 (1938).
SECONDARY SOURCES
Browning, A Comparative Glance at the Anti-Monopoly Laws of the United
States and Mexico, 42 TEXAS L. REV. 577 (1964).
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THE NETHERLANDS
LAW
Economic Competition Act of 28 June 1956, as amended by the Act of 16
July 1958.
Synopsis
The Economic Competition Act (Act) deals with two subjects: regulation of
competition which is defined as "any agreement or decision governed by civil
law, regulating economic competition between owners of enterprises"; and
dominant position which is defined as "a factual or legal relationship in trade
or industry involving a predominant influence by one or more owners of
enterprises on a market for goods or servies in the Netherlands." Actions are
brought by the government only when such actions are deemed to be in the
public interest. Any private action by interested third parties is limited to
filing complaints with the government.
Section 2 of the Act requires notification to the minister of economic
affairs of any "regulation of competition" within one month after such regula-
tion comes into being. However, the minister may grant exemptions to the
notification requirement, and have in fact done so for certain types of agree-
ments (for example, joint purchase or sale agreements, agreements regard-
ing exclusive selling or purchasing rights, and others).
The minister can make a competition regulation binding on an entire
branch or sector of a trade or industry for a period not to exceed three years,
where such an action is deemed to be within the public interest. However,
the minister may invoke an Order in Council which declares that specific
elements of regulations of competition are not valid for a period of five years,
again only where the public interest requires such an action.
This authority has been invoked regarding, respectively, collective resale
price maintenance and individual resale price maintenance for certain dur-
able consumer products, and agreements restricting competition which re-
quire binding arbitration of disputes. This prohibition may be and in fact has
been extended in these areas by periodic statutory enactments. Before the
minister can take any of these actions, however, the matter is referred to the
Economic Competition Commission, which is a Crown-appointed panel of
independent experts who act in an advisory capacity, giving consideration to
both the competition regulations and claims of dominant position. The Com-
mission publishes a notice of public hearings, and all interested parties may
present their positions at that time. Also, the Commission has the power to
make otherwise secret information public for the purpose of informed public
involvement in the hearing process.
Ministerial decrees under the Act must be complied with by all enter-
prises operating in the Netherlands (whether foreign or domestic), but the
Act does not have extraterritorial effect. Noncompliance with a ministerial
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decree can give rise to criminal sanctions, although in practice damage re-
medies are more common. The government has instituted relatively few in-
vestigations under the Act, due mainly to the high burden of proof required
to establish a violation contrary to the public interest. Draft legislation has
been submitted to the Parliament to amend the statute's approach to control
of horizontal and vertical price arrangements, making such arrangements
prima facie contrary to the public interest, with the enterprise bearing the
burden of showing that its actions fall within one of the specific exceptions
allowed; this legislation is likely to be adopted in the near future. Recommen-
dations have also been made for the development of premerger controls;
action in this area, however, is unlikely in the near future.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Boot & de Jong, Chapter 20, Economic Law, in INTRODUCTION TO DUTCH
LAW FOR FOREIGN LAWYERS (Fokkema, Chorus, Hondius & Lisser
eds. 1978).
OECD, GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, VOL.
V (1964).
[1972] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 27,005 et seq.
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
LAW
Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act, No. 24 of 1955, as amended by
the Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Amendments Acts, Nos. 14 of
1958, 48 of 1975, 23 of 1976, and 75 of 1978.
Synopsis
The Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act of 1955, as amended (Act)
empowers the minister of economic affairs to control, prevent, or eliminate
monopolistic practices "detrimental to the public interest." The Act also em-
powers the Board of Trade and Industries to conduct investigations into
alleged monopolistic conditions and to make recommendations to the minis-
ter of economic affairs.
The Act applies to:
(a) Every agreement, arrangement, or understanding, whether legally
enforceable or not, between two or more companies;
(b) Every business practice or method of trading, including any
method of fixing prices;
(c) Every act or omission on the part of any person, whether acting
independently or in concert with any other person;
(d) Every situation arising out of the activities of any person or class or
group of persons;
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which by directly or indirectly restricting competition, has or is calculated to
have, the effect of-
(i) restricting the output or disposal of any commodity;
(ii) limiting the facilities available for the production or distribution of
any commodity;
(iii) enhancing or maintaining prices;
(iv) preventing the production or distribution of any commodity by the
most efficient or economic means;
(v) preventing or retarding the development or introduction of techni-
cal improvements or the expansion of existing markets or the opening
up of new markets;
(vi) preventing or retarding the entry of new products or distribution
into any branch of trade or industry; or
(vii) preventing or retarding the adjustment of any branch of trade or
industry to changing circumstances.
Specific types of monopolistic practices may be prohibited by the Board of
Trade and Industries, or a cease and desist order may be issued to a par-
ticular party within a specific trade. However, takeover bids are actually
aided by a provision of the South African Companies Act which stipulates
that when a bidding company acquires 90 percent of another company's
outstanding shares, the remaining 10 percent must be relinquished to the
bidding company.
South African law does not specifically prohibit monopolies or require
prior government approval for mergers. It more closely resembles the British
system than the U.S., in that mergers and voluntary agreements are permis-
sible if deemed to be in the public interest. Since the Act provides no defini-
tion of public interest, the Board of Trade and Industries has to weigh the
advantages and disadvantages of the monopolistic condition and conclude on
the preponderance of the evidence, and in light of its own assessment of the
facts, whether the monopolistic condition in question is justified. A merger
that creates "monopolistic conditions" may be dissolved.
In the period 1955 to 1976 the minister of economic affairs ordered the
Board of Trade and Industries to conduct eighteen investigations into sus-
pected monopolistic conditions of which fifteen had been completed through
1979. Only four prosecutions resulted in convictions through 1976. Further-
more, the minister has only irregularly issued directives to undertake an
investigation. During two five-year-periods, no directives were given to the
Board of Trade and Industries. Investigations that were undertaken were
quite lengthy-more than two years on the average-and even in those in-
vestigations for which the minister of economic affairs issued an order, very
little was done to enforce such orders prior to 1974.
Nonetheless, Section 18 of the Act provides for fines or imprisonment or
both for specified violations. Section 8(1) provides that any person who fails
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to comply with an order issued by the minister of economic affairs, and based
upon the Board of Trade and Industries' investigation into suspected mono-
polistic conditions is guilty of an offense and liable for a fine not exceeding
R 20,000 (ten thousand pounds) or imprisonment not exceeding five years,
or both. Any person who fails to comply with the Board of Trade and Indus-
tries' investigation by submitting requested information or who knowingly
furnishes false information is likewise guilty of an offense and liable to a fine
not exceeding five thousand pounds or imprisonment not exceeding two-and-
one-half years, or both.
Merger and acquisitions policy will be substantially changed by the re-
port of the Mouton Commission (Commission) (published in 1977), if the
government accepts the Commission's recommendations. Although a draft
bill embodying some of the recommendations of the Commission was pub-
lished for general information in February 1978, it appears, as a result of
criticism, that the draft is being reconsidered by the Department of Com-
merce. The Mouton Commission contends the Act's main weakness lies in its
inability to deal effectively with the merger problem. While the Act may be
used to dissolve harmful concentrations that result from horizontal and verti-
cal mergers, conglomerates may fall outside the Act. The Commission also
questions the wisdom and efficacy of compulsory dissolution of consum-
mated vertical and horizonal mergers. The Commission concluded that the
decision to entrust enforcement of the Act to the Board of Trade and Indus-
tries rather than an autonomous body has interfered with proper implemen-
tation of the legislation. The Commission considered it unrealistic to expect
the Board of Trade and Industries to be an impartial judge and effective
policeman of those firms with which the Board had been closely linked and
whose growth and well-being had been its primary task for years.
The Commission's proposals concerning mergers are:
(a) Since the Commission is not in favor of the per se prohibition of
economic concentration, or of behavior which causes such concen-
tration, the proposal concerns the need to provide in the legislation
for the investigation of mergers, takeovers and other methods of
acquiring control on an individual basis in accordance with the re-
quirements of the public interest;
(b) the Commission is not in favor of an elaborate system for the scru-
tiny of mergers, takeovers and other forms of acquiring control in-
volving provision for pre-notification and criteria, such as total as-
sets or market shares for the screening of amalgamations. Apart
from the demands on time and manpower which such a system
would involve and which the country can ill afford it would not
cover "creeping" takeovers, i.e., the purchase of shares over a pe-
riod until control of another company is obtained;
(c) there should be established a quasi-judicial body which may be
called the Merger Tribunal presided over by a judge or by some
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other independent person together with at least two further mem-
bers experienced in, or with the knowledge of, the problems in this
field;
(d) the Tribunal would have the power not only to forbid a takeover to
proceed but also to break it up once it had been completed and to
break up the results of a "creeping" takeover or indeed any form of
conglomerate if it considers it in the public interest to do so;
(e) the Tribunal should complete its investigation and report its deci-
sion to the Minister within three months after the date of reference,
and the Mnister must convey his decision to the relevant parties
within two weeks after receipt of the Tribunal's decision; and
(f) the Commission considers that the existing maximum fine of
twenty thousand Rand can no longer be considered adequate and
favors an increase in the maximum fine.
SECONDARY SOURCES
MACGREGOR, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND SHAREHOLDERS (1979).
VENEZUELA
LAW
Decision 24 of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, Common Re-
gime of Treatment of Foreign Capital, Patents, Licenses and Royalties, re-
printed in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 138 (1977), commonly known as the Andean
Foreign Investment Code (AFIC) and incorporated into Venezuelan law by
Decree 2,031, Feb. 8, 1977, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1531 (1977)
and in Gac. Of. 31,171 (Feb. 9, 1977) (Ven.) and Decree 2,442, Nov. 8, 1977,
Gac. Of. 2,100 Ex. (Nov. 15, 1977) (Ven.).
Synopsis
In order to encourage domestic financial and technological development,
Venezuela has enacted legislation that regulates foreign investment and mul-
tinational corporate activity in Venezuela. The AFIC and Decree 2442 re-
quire that all new and existing foreign investments be registered with and
approved by the government. Loans from foreign sources to Venezuelan
enterprises must receive prior government approval; all contracts to import
technology, or license patents or trademarks must also be approved and
registered. Failure to comply with these registration requirements will result
in the loss of the right to remit earnings or capital, to make payments on
principal or interest, and to transfer royalties abroad.
The Foreign Investment Agency (SIEX), responsible to the Venezuelan
Ministry of Finance, is a government agency charged with supervising all
foreign investments. If a direct foreign investment is to be approved, such
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approval must come from SIEX within 180 days after a completed application
is filed. Aggrieved enterprises can appeal an adverse decision of SIEX.
All foreign enterprises investing in Venezuela after December 31, 1974
must agree to transform themselves into "mixed" or "national" companies
within fifteen years. For the purpose of this provision the expansion of an
existing investment is treated as a new investment. In a mixed enterprise
foreign investors hold less than 50 percent of the stock; an enterprise is
considered national when foreigners own less than 20 percent of its shares.
When computing percentages, citizens of other Andean Common Market
countries can be treated as Venezuelan nationals.
Certain sectors of the Venezuelan economy are reserved for national
companies. One such sector is public services, which includes telecommuni-
cations, mail, drinking water, electricity, sanitation, and security. The follow-
ing industries are also limited to national companies: domestic transportation
services, advertising, television, Spanish language newspapers and maga-
zines, and retail firms. Certain companies are exempt from national and
mixed company requirements: companies selling goods made in Venezuela,
companies providing services, such as computer software or rental cars, and
firms importing capital equipment.
In the area of technology transfer, domestic development is the principal
goal. Royalty payments between a majority foreign-owned subsidiary and its
parent or affiliates are prohibited, and such payments may not be deducted
from taxable income. Foreign enterprises that have agreed to convert into
national or mixed enterprises are exempt from this proscription, however. If a
foreign company transfers technology to a Venezuelan subsidiary, it is obli-
gated to train Venezuelan personnel in the use of the transferred technology.
Recently there has been an effort to regulate the commercially restrictive
practices of Venezuela's domestic enterprises. The Venezuelan legislature is
presently considering a bill that would prohibit most acts and agreements
that create or threaten to create a monopoly situation. Under the proposed
legislation certain types of cartel arrangements are permissible, including
those for supply, payment, and quantity discount standards, standardization
of goods, uniform trade practices, promotion of export sales, and production
of agricultural goods. However, with all such exceptions the enterprise must
notify the government of the agreement; government approval will be
granted only if the parties prove that the same result cannot be reached by
other means and establish that the agreement will not prejudice the means
of production or supply.
The proposed law also prohibits price-fixing agreements, although it
permits resale price maintenance arrangements. The statute does not auto-
matically prohibit agreements that limit the use of goods or services acquired
by price-fixing agreements, nor does it bar tying arrangements. Instead the
government reserves the right to examine these arrangements and, if neces-
sary, void them. The bill also prohibits agreements concerning licenses, pa-
tents, designs, or industrial secrets that impose substantial limitations on the
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acquiring party, except when the limitation or improvements relate to a price
agreement between the parties, or to sales in a foreign market.
The bill also authorizes the prohibition of all economic abuses by market-
dominating enterprises. To this end it will control merger, acquisitions, and
transfer of assets. It will accomplish this by requiring the parties involved to
notify the government of such agreements when it is probable that an enter-
prise will acquire 20 percent of an industry market or that an enterprise
already possessing such market power shall increase it. The proposal in gen-
eral terms limits abusive pricing, purchase and sales restrictions, and price
discrimination. The penalties for violations of the proposed statute are fines,
calculated as a percentage of paid income tax, and prison terms.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Brewer-Corias, Regimen de competencia entre empresas publicas y empresas
privados en la sistima venezolana, 119781 PONENCIAS VENEZOLANAS
261-300.
Carl & Johnson, Venezuela and the Andean Common Market, 7 DEN. J. of
INT'L L. 151-196 (1978).
White, La legislacion antimonopoica y el control del poder economico en Amer-
ica Latina: recien tendencias, 28-29 DERECHO DE LA INTEGRACION 35-
59 (1978).
